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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States· 
contains three clauses designed to protect citizens from the govern-
ment's power to prosecute: the prohibition of Excessive Bail, Exces-
sive. Fines, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment. 2 The Eighth 
Amendment, although historically applied to criminal prosecutions 
and "direct actions initiated by government to inflict punishment,"3 
has recently been held to apply in the civil arena as well. In Austin 
v. United States,4 the Supreme Court of the United States concluded 
that "forfeiture generally and statutory in rem forfeiture in particular 
historically have been understood, at least in part, as punishment."5 
Accordingly, the Court held that modern statutory forfeiture,6 pur-
suant to the commission of drug offenses, constituted punishment 
and was subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment. 7 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed the issue of 
constitutional limitations on civil in rem forfeiture, for the first time, 
in Aravanis v. Somerset County.s In Aravanis, the court found that 
1. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Excessive 
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
plIDishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
2. Id.; see also Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 
257, 266 (1989). 
3. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 260. 
4. 509 U.S. 602 (1993). 
5. Id. at 618. 
6. The Court in Austin was concerned with 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) & (a)(7) (1988 
& SUpp. V 1993) which provide for the forfeiture of: 
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are 
used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate 
the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of [con-
trolled substances, their raw materials, and equipment used in their 
manufacture and distribution] .... 
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including 
any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and 
any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be 
used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission 
of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's 
imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this 
paragraph, to the extent of an interest in an owner, by reason of any 
act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or 
omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner. 
21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) & (a)(7) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also Austin, 509 
U.S. at 622. 
7. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 622. 
8. 339 Md. 644, 651, 664 A.2d 888, 891 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 
(1996). 
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Maryland's forfeiture statute 9 was similar to the statute at issue in 
Austin, and therefore, punitive in nature. lO Accordingly, Maryland's 
high court concluded that civil in rem forfeiture constituted punish-
ment. II The court did not, however, reach the issue of the applicability 
of the Eighth Amendment to the state forfeiture action. 12 Rather, 
recognizing that Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights l3 
has long been considered in pari materia with the Eighth Amendment, 
it held that the excessive fines provision of article 25 was dispositive 
of the case sub judice.14 While setting forth broad parameters, the 
court did not articulate "a precise formula or laundry list of factors" 
to be considered in determining whether a particular forfeiture vio-
lates article 25. IS Rather, the court felt it prudent to allow trial judges 
to determine the appropriate factors to be weighed, on a case-by-
case basis, and remanded the instant case back to the trial court for 
a determination of whether the forfeiture was constitutionally exces-
sive. 16 
By not clearly defining a test to determine whether or not a fine 
is excessive, Maryland will undoubtedly join the myriad of jurisdic-
tions fending for themselves. Such a lack of direction from the high 
9. The statute involved in Aravanis was Article 27, Section 297(m) of the An-
notated Code of Maryland which provides in relevant part: 
(m) Forfeiture of interest in real property. - (1)(i) Except as provided 
in subsection (I) [innocent owner defense] of this section and paragraph 
(2) of this subsection [principal family residence owned tenants by the 
entirety, may not be forfeited unless both parties are convicted], an 
owner's interest in real propeity may be forfeited if the real property 
was used in connection with a violation of § 286, § 286A, § 286B, § 
286C, or § 290 of this article in relation to these offenses. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(m) (1996); see also Aravanis, 339 Md. at 654, 
664 A.2d at 893. 
10. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 655, 664 A.2d at 893. 
11. See id. 
12. See id. at 655-56, 664 A.2d at 893. 
13. Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides "[t]hat excessive 
bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual 
punishment inflicted, by the Courts of Law." MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 
25 (1981). 
14. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 654-56, 664 A.2d at 893-94. Article 25 was based 
on the English Bill of Rights of 1689. See id. at 656, 664 A.2d at 894 (citing 
Walker v. State, 53 Md. App. 171, 183, 452 A.2d 1234, 1240 (1980) (citing 
Phipps v. State, 39 Md. App. 206, 211, 385 A.2d 90, 93-94 (1978))). Article 
25 served as a model for the Eighth Amendment. See Browning-Ferris Indus., 
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,264 n.5 (1989). Thus, the Excessive 
Fines Clause of Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is textually 
identical to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See 
Aravanis, 339 Md. at 656, 664 A.2d at 893-94. Article 25 is considered to be 
in pari materia with the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 894. 
15. Id at 665, 664 A.2d at 898. 
16. See id. at 666, 664 A.2d at 898-99. 
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courts has resulted in a loss of uniformity among United States 
circuit courts17 and courts of the several states. 18 The lack of unifor-
mity has resulted from the failure of the highest courts to articulate 
definitive methods and factors to be considered in determining "ex-
cessiveness.' '19 
This note will examine the court of appeals's decision in Aravanis 
by first tracing the historical purpose and modern developments of 
civil in rem forfeiture, with deliberate emphasis on Maryland state 
law. It will then address the impact of determining civil in rem 
forfeitures to be punitive, especially in light of protections provided 
by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 20 
17. See infra notes 92, 94, and accompanying text. 
18. See, e.g., In re 2120 S. 4th Ave., 870 P.2d 417 (Az. 1994) (holding that Eighth 
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to civil in rem drug 
forfeitures because such forfeitures are remedial in nature and do not constitute 
punishment); Thorpe v. State, 450 S.E.2d 416 (Ga. 1994) (adopting test from 
United States v. 6625 Zumirez Dr., 845 F. Supp. 725 (C.D. Cal. 1994»; Evans 
v. State, 458 S.E.2d 859 (Ga. App. 1995) (following test promulgated in 
Zumirez, 845 F. Supp at 725-42); Cade v. Lot 2 in Block 5 of Vista Village 
Addition, 885 P .2d 381 (Idaho 1994) (finding civil in rem forfeiture to be 
punishment and hence subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment; remanding to trial court for determination of excessiveness without 
formulating a test); Waller v. 1989 Ford F350 Truck, 642 N.E.2d 460 (Ill. 
1994) (adopting Zumirez test); State v. Hellis, 536 N.W.2d 587 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1995) (holding that protection under Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment is only triggered when forfeiture is disproportionate to the offense 
committed); State v. $7000, 642 A.2d 967 (N.J. 1994) (failing to reach consti-
tutional question of excessiveness; stating only that a direct causal connection 
must exist between the property and the crime); State v. Hill, 635 N.E.2d 1248 
(Ohio 1994) (holding Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment and Ohio 
constitution apply to civil in rem drug forfeiture; failing promulgate a test); 
In re King Properties, 635 A.2d 128 (Pa. 1993) (adopting instrumentality test 
and expressly rejecting proportionality test and requiring instead that forfeited 
property be used significantly in the commission of the offense; stating that a 
significant relationship between the property and the offense is only evidenced 
by a pattern of similar incidents); State v. 392 S. 600 E., 886 P.2d 534 (Utah 
1994) (holding instrumentality is threshold test: state must prove substantial 
nexus between property and crime and state must establish a pattern of illegal 
activities occurring at the property; holding further that once instrumentality 
is established proportionality review may be appropriate; failing, however, to 
define proportionality). 
19. See supra note 18 and infra notes 92, 94. 
20. The Fifth Amendment provides: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offen[s]e to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
A. The History of Civil In Rem Forfeiture 
A forfeiture is a penalty by which one loses rights, title, and 
interest in property in consequence of a default or an offense.21 
Three types of forfeiture were established in England at the time 
Maryland's article 25 and the Eighth Amendment were ratified: (1) 
deodand; (2) statutory forfeiture; and (3) forfeiture following con-
viction for a felony or treasonP Deodands were forfeitures to the 
Crown following the accidental death of a King's subject, in an 
amount equal to the value of the inanimate object that directly, or 
indirectly, was responsible for the loss of life. 23 Statutory forfeiture, 
provided for the forfeiture of objects used in violation of custom 
and revenue laws.24 The third type was commonly known as forfeiture 
of estate. 25 Following a property owner's conviction of a felony or 
of treason, all of his real and personal property were forfeited to 
the Crown.26 Statutory forfeiture27 became a part of the American 
scheme of justice28 and can be either criminal or civil in nature. 
Criminal forfeiture is analogous to forfeitures of estate, while civil 
in rem forfeiture has been characterized as a merger of deodand and 
statutory forfeiture.29 
Criminal forfeiture statutes were enacted to punish criminal 
defendants following conviction of a requisite criminal offense. 30 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation. 
U.S. CONST. amend .. V. 
21. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 650 (6th ed. 1990). 
22. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-83 (1974). 
23. See Robert Lieske, Civil Forfeiture Law: Replacing the Common Law With a 
Common Sense Application of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 265, 273 (1995). For example, a wagon 
wheel falls off the back of a lorry and strikes a child on the side of the road, 
causing her death. The owner of the wheel would be required to pay, to the 
crown, the monetary value of the wheel, which was the instrumentality of the 
child's death. Cj. id. at 273-75. 
24. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682. 
25. See id. 
26. See id. 
27. Forfeitures are not favored in the law and must be authorized by a specific 
statute. See United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pickup, 769 F.2d 525, 527 
(8th Cir. 1985); see also 37 C.J.S. Forfeitures § 5(a) (1943). 
28. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682. 
29. See id. 
30. See Libretti v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 356, 363 (1995). Criminal forfeiture 
statutes currently punish criminal conduct in violation of federal racketeering 
and drug laws. See id.; see also Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 
399-403 (1991) (tracing the statutory history of the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit. II, 98 Stat. 1976, which 
instituted criminal forfeiture for violations of federal law). 
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Such forfeitures are considered sanctions and are imposed upon 
criminal defendants as part of their sentences. 31 The proceeding is 
considered in personam, as it is a direct punishment against an 
individual for criminal conduct.32 The excessiveness analysis for in 
personam criminal forfeitures centers on the amount of the forfeiture 
in relation to the severity of the offense. 33 
Conversely, civil in rem forfeitures are based on the premise 
that "the thing is primarily considered the offender. "34 Thus, in rem 
proceedings are brought directly against the offensive propertY,3S the 
focus being on the property's guilt, rather than on the guilt of the 
property's owner.36 This often led to harsh results when a property 
owner, innocent of wrongdoing, lost title to "tainted" propertyY 
The harshness of civil in rem forfeiture has been abrogated, in 
modern times, by statutory provisiong38 and constitutional safe-
31. See Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 363. 
32. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 624 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
see also William J. Hughes & Edward H. O'Connell, Jr., In Personam 
(Criminal) Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felonies: An Expansion of a Harsh 
English Tradition into a Modern Dilemma, 11 PEPP. L. REv. 613, 618 (1984). 
33. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 627 (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 
571-74 (1993». Alexander was a criminal forfeiture action decided on the same 
day as Austin. See Alexander, 509 U.S. at 559 n.4. In Alexander, the defendant 
contended that the taking of his 31 wholesale and retail businesses and 
$9,000,000 in cash was excessive because his conviction was based only on the 
seizure of seven obscene materials. See id. at 547-48, 558. The Court found 
that the Excessive Fines Clause did apply to the criminal forfeiture. See id. at 
559. On remand, however, the Supreme Court urged the Eighth Circuit to 
evaluate the excessiveness of the taking not on the number of materials found, 
but on the temporal and criminal extent of the defendant's racketeering 
enterprise. See id. The Court's emphasis in criminal (in personam) forfeiture, 
therefore, is clearly on the culpability of the property's owner, and not that 
of the property. 
34. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921). 
35. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 793 (6th ed. 1990). 
36. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 
(1974) (permitting forfeiture of a yacht, upon which a single marijuana cigarette 
was found, despite the innocence of the yacht's owner); Goldsmith-Grant, 254 
U.S. at 510 (permitting forfeiture of automobile used in liquor tax avoidance 
scheme, despite the use of the automobile without the permission or knowledge 
of the owner); United States v. Harmony, 43 U.S. 210 (1844) (permitting 
forfeiture of a cargo vessel used in acts of piracy on the high seas, despite 
owner's lack of culpability, but permitting the innocent owner of the vessel to 
retain the cargo contained therein, because the cargo was not guilty of an 
offense). 
37. See supra note 36 and infra note 38. 
38. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring government to 
show that there is (1) probable cause that property was used, or intended to 
be used, to facilitate illegal drug activity; and (2) owner of property has 
opportunity to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the owner had 
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guards.39 Innocent owners of property that was used to further illegal 
purposes can now implement an innocent owner defense, as permitted 
by statute. 4O Moreover, the application of constitutional analysis 
affords the owner of seized property an additional means of regaining 
title to "guilty" property41 if the owner can show that the taking of 
the owner's property is "excessive." If the taking is deemed excessive, 
then the forfeiture will be considered unconstitutional and the prop-
erty will remain titled to the owner. 42 
1. The Federal Scheme of Civil In Rem Forfeiture 
Civil in rem forfeiture has been part of the American legal 
landscape since the American Revolution and was utilized during our 
country's infancy to remedy crimes such as piracy 43 as well as to 
enforce protective tariffs on luxury goodsW and tobacco imports.4s 
During the 1920s, it was used to combat bootleggers seeking to 
circumvent the prohibition of alcohol.46 Currently, civil in rem for-
feiture is used to assail illegal gambling,47 the sexual exploitation of 
no culpability with regards to the drug activity); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 
2fJ7 (1996) (permitting grant of remission of forfeiture to protect the rights of 
innocent parties and prohibiting forfeiture of family home, held in tenancy by 
the entireties, unless both parties have been convicted of offenses expressed in 
the statute). It must be noted, however, that such protections are not available 
for property that is the direct proceeds of criminal activity. See 21 U.S.C. 
881(a)(6) (1988 & Supp. V 1995). Extending such protections to "fruits" of 
criminal activity would, in effect, reward the felon for criminal acts and permit 
illegally gotten gains to be shielded from forfeiture actions. See United States 
v. Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231, 1236 (8th Cir. 1994). The Eighth Circuit succinctly 
explained, "Forfeiture of proceeds cannot be considered punishment, and thus, 
subject to the excessive fines clause, as it slmply parts the owner from the 
fruits of the criminal activity." Id. 
39. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (holding Eighth Amendment 
Excessive Fines Clause applicable to civil in rem forfeiture). 
40. See supra notes 36, 38. 
41. For purposes of this discussion, the property at issue will be assumed to have 
been used, or intended to be used, in the facilitation of a statutorily prohibited 
activity, as opposed to contraband or property directly traceable as proceeds 
of illegal activity. See supra notes 36, 38. 
42. See United States v. Shelly's Riverside Heights Lot X, 851 F. Supp. 633 (M.D. 
Pa. 1994) (finding forfeiture of family farm and residence used to manufacture 
marijuana for personal consumption excessive in relation to the criminal 
offense). See infra notes 269-72 and accompanying text. 
43. See Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210 (1844). 
44. See Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. 347 (1808). 
45. See Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237 (1877). 
46. See Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921). 
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (1994). 
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children,48 money laundering,49 organized crime, 50 and illegal drug 
trafficking.51 
An examination of the mechanics of civil in rem forfeiture reveals 
why it has historically been favored by law enforcement. To com-
mence civil in rem proceedings, prosecutors need only prove that 
there is probable cause to believe that the property was used in the 
commission or facilitation of a crimeY The property is then "pun-
48. See 18 U .S.C. § 2254 (1994). 
49. See 18 U .S.C. § 981 (1994). 
SO. See The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994). 
51. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994); see also supra note 6. 
52. At the federal level, the initial burden of proof in attaching property for trial, 
in civil forfeiture actions, falls on the government to show probable cause that 
the property was· connected to a drug crime. See United States v. Milbrand, 
58 F.3d 841, 844 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Rural Route 1, Box 137-B, 
24 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. RR # 1, Box 224, 14 F.3d 
864, 869 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Shelly's Riverside Heights Lot X, 851 
F. Supp. 633, 637 (M.D. Pa. 1994). The burden then shifts, in the majority 
of the circuits, to the claimant to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the property is not subject to forfeiture. See Milbrand, 58 F.3d at 844. 
But see United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 
1995) (placing the burden on the government to show a substantial connection 
between the property and the offense, once a claimant asserts that forfeiture 
violates the Excessive Fines Clause). Although the Maryland courts have not 
yet reached this specific issue, two recently decided cases indicate that their 
approach will probably be more analogous to the majority method. 
In 1986 Mercedes Benz 560 CE v. State, 334 Md. 264, 279, 638 A.2d 
1164, 1171 (1994), the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed burdens of 
proof following the assertion of an innocent owner defense. In its analysis, 
the court stated that once adequate evidence is presented that property is 
subject to forfeiture under section 297 a presumption of forfeitability arises. 
See 1986 Mercedes Benz 560 CE, 334 Md. at 279, 638 A.2d at 1171. The 
burden then shifts to the claimant to rebut the presumption by a preponderance 
of the evidence. See id.; see also State v. One 1984 Toyota Truck, 311 Md. 
171, 183, 533 A.2d 659, 665 (1987) (holding the innocent owner defense 
provided for within section 297 is an affirmative defense and the burden is on 
the owner to show ·"entitlement to exemption"). 
This approach was applied in One Ford Motor Vehicle v. State, 104 Md. 
App. 744, 657 A.2d 825 (1995). The issue before the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland concerned determining ownership of a motor vehicle seized by 
the police following a drug arrest. See id. at 751-53, 657 A.2d at 828-29. The 
automobile was not titled to the drug offender, but rather was held in his 
sister's name. See id. at 750, 657 A.2d at 828. The court recognized that there 
W& a presumption that the named title holder was the owner of the property, 
but that the state had rebutted that presumption. See id. The appellate court 
considered the ownership issue a question of fact properly left for the trier of 
fact to determine. See id. In support of the trial judge's decision, the appellate 
court noted that the drug offender possessed both sets of the car's keys and 
exercised complete control over the vehicle. See id. at 748, 657 A.2d at 827. 
Further, the court stated that the "claimant hard] the burden of proving the 
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ished" through seizure, and the secondary punitive effect on the 
owner of the property is not considered relevant. S3 The civil nature 
of the proceeding affords prosecutors a lower burden of proof,s4 
while it deprives property owners the protections guaranteed to 
criminal defendants under the Bill of Rights of the United States 
Constitution. ss 
The owners of "offensive" property, in modern times, have 
been afforded some protection by the enactment of "innocent owner" 
defenses.s6 Constitutional protections, such as due process constraints 
on law enforcement officials, S7 have also strengthened the position 
of claimants. The Supreme Court's decision in Austin, that the Eighth 
Amendment protection against excessive fines is available in civil in 
rem proceedings, adds another layer of protection heretofore una-
vailable.sa 
a. The History of Title 21 U.S.C. Section 881 
The forfeiture statute at issue in Austin was originally enacted 
as The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 
1970. s9 The Act authorized the federal government to seize cars, 
equipment, and other instrumentalities used to manufacture or trans-
port illegal drugs.60 In 1978, the Act was amended to include a 
claimant [was] an 'innocent owner.'" Id. at 753, 674 A.2d at 829 (citing One 
Toyota Truck, 311 Md. at 183-84, 533 A.2d at 664-65). The court stated that 
"if an innocent owner can satisfy the court that he/she has an interest in the 
property, it should not be forfeited." Id. at 751, 657 A.2d at 829. Thus, the 
burden of proof rests on the party asserting ownership of the property to 
prove that the party is innocent of the underlying offense and are the rightful 
owner of the property. 
The assertion of a constitutionally excessive fine, if successful, provides a 
remedy to the claimant analogous to the remedy afforded by the innocent 
owner defense. See supra notes 36-38. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, 
that the procedure for proving this constitutional claim will, likewise, mirror 
that of the innocent owner defense. 
53. See Steven V. Miller, So What Rights Does A HMET Mobile Home Have 
Anyway? In Austin v. United States, the Supreme Court Applies the Excessive 
Fines Clause to In Rem Civil Forfeitures, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 797 (1994). 
54. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 608 n.4 (1993) (citing In re Winship, 
3fJ7 U.S. 358 (1970». 
55. See Miller, supra note 53, at 797. 
56. See supra notes 36-38. 
57. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993); 
see also United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding Fourth 
Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure applies to civil 
in rem forfeiture). 
58. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622. 
59. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994). 
60. See ide 
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provision that would subject profits earned from illegal drug activity 
to forfeiture. 61 Congress again broadened the reach of law enforce-
ment with the enactment of The Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
of 198462 allowing the seizure of real property used in the commission 
or facilitation of drug activity, 63 as well as providing an innocent 
owner defense provision.64 
2. The Maryland Scheme of Civil In Rem Forfeiture 
Maryland's drug forfeiture statute predates the federal statute 
by some twenty years. 65 In its original form,66 the Maryland statute 
allowed for forfeiture of conveyances of illegal drugs and also 
contained an innocent owner provision. 67 The statute in force at this 
61. See 21 U .S.C. 881(a)(6) (1994); see also S. Rep. No. 225 (1984), reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374 (stating that for efforts against drug trafficking 
to be successful, the economic benefits of the drug trade must be attacked), 
62. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994). 
63. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994). 
64. See id. 
65. The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act was enacted by Chapter 59 of the Laws of 
1935 by the Maryland State Legislature. In 1951, Senate Bill 406 was unani-
mously passed by the Maryland State legislature and became Chapter 471 of 
the Laws of 1951. Senate Bill 406 added a new section, codified at MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 27, §§ 276-305, to the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act allowing for 
forfeiture of "tainted" property. 
66. The relevant section in the case at bar is MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (1996). 
The predecessor to § 297 was codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 301 and 
stated: 
In addition to any other fines or penalties provided for a violation 
of provisions of this subtitle, any motor vehicle, vessel or aircraft 
used or employed in the concealment, conveying or transporting of 
any such narcotic drugs, or used during the course of any violation 
of this subtitle by any person or persons convicted of the same shall 
upon the conviction or convictions be declared by the court to be 
forfeited to the county or to Baltimore City, as the cac;e may be; 
provided that no vehicle be forfeited hereunder un/~ the owner 
thereof authorized or permitted such use or employment .... " 
Art. 27, § 301 (emphasis added). 
67. See supra note 66. The operation of this affirmative defense, however, was 
negated in 1970 by the repeal of the original statute and enactment of the 
Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substance Act, which did not provide innocent 
owners with protection from forfeiture of "tainted" property. On July 1, 1970, 
Chapter 403 of the Laws of 1970 took effect, repealing sections 276-313D of 
article 27 and substituting sections 276-302 under the new subheading, "Health-
Controlled Dangerous Substances." See Prince George's County v. One 1969 
Opel, 267 Md. 491, 495, 298 A.2d 168, 170 (1973). Specifically, section 297 
was substituted for section 301. See id. This change in Maryland's statutory 
scheme was recognized by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Prince George's 
County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 658-59, 284 A.2d 203, 204-05 
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writing is essentially the same as the federal statute.68 It provides for 
the forfeiture of conveyances and real property used to facilitate 
drug transactions, as well as providing for the forfeiture of the 
proceeds of illegal drug activity. 69 . 
B. The Prohibition Against Excessive Fines 
The recent decisions in Aravanis v. Somerset County7° and Austin 
v. United States71 establish a protection to property owner's beyond 
that which is provided by statute - a guarantee that such forfeitures 
not be unconstitutionally excessive. 
1. The Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against Excessive Fines 
The Eighth Amendmenf2 was adopted to control abuses of the 
federal government's prosecutorial power. 73 The debate surrounding 
(1971), where the court acknowledged the legal fiction that an inanimate object 
can be guilty of a crime. It further recognized that the historic treatment of 
forfeiture followed the ancient law of deodand. See id. Additionally, it noted 
that the statute in force prior to July 1, 1970 "was contrary to the general 
view." Id. at 659, 284 A.2d at 205. Finally, the court held that while the 
taking of "tainted" property from an innocent owner was harsh, it was not 
constitutionally barred. See id. at 662, 284 A.2d at 206. 
In 1972, however, a narrow innocent owner defense was adopted by the 
legislature. See State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van Serial No. IGCCG15D8D 
104615, 309 Md. 327, 330-31, 524 A.2d 51, 52-53 (1987). This exception dealt 
primarily with automobiles but did not require return of the property to the 
lienholder. Rather, they permitted the state to sell the automobile, deduct their 
expenses from the proceeds, and apply the balance to the lien. 
In 1984, the statute was again amended to provide additional protection 
to lienholders. See id. at 331-32, 524 A.2d at 53. A new subsection was enacted 
which required that: "No conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions 
of this section to the extent of the interest of any owner of the conveyance 
who neither knew or should have known that the conveyance was used or was 
to be used in violation of this subtitle." Art. 27, § 297(a)(4)(iii). This new 
subsection was subsequently construed to afford a broad innocent owner 
defense. See State v. One 1984 Toyota Truck, 311 Md. 171, 182-84, 533 A.2d 
659, 664-65 (1987). The statute in force at this writing expressly provides 
protection to innocent owners of tainted property. Subsection (c) states: "Prop-
erty not subject to forfeiture. - Property or an interest in property described 
under subsection (b)(4) , (9), and (10) of this section may not be forfeited if 
the owner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation of 
this subheading was done without the owner's actual knowledge." § 279(c). 
68. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §297(m) (1996). 
69. See id. 
70. 339 Md. 644, 664 A.2d 888 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996). 
71. 5(9 U.S. 602 (1993). 
72. See supra note 1 for the text of the Eighth Amendment. 
73. See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. V. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 
(1989). 
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the adoption of the amendment was minimal and the Excessive Fines 
Clause received "even less attention.' >74 This lack of attention con-
tinued into modern times because the Supreme Court did not address 
the application of the Excessive Fines Clause until its 1989 decision 
in Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. 75 In hold-
ing the Excessive Fines Clause inapplicable to disputes between private 
parties, the Court stated that the clause "was intended to limit only 
those fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the government. "76 
While the Browning-Ferris Court acknowledged that the Eighth 
Amendment had long been understood to apply exclusively to crim-
inal cases,77 it declined to hold that the Excessive Fines Clause was 
solely applicable to the criminal arena.78 
The Court revisited this issue in Austin, and held that the 
Excessive Fines Clause was a limitation on civil in rem forfeiture 
imposed for the commission of drug offenses. 79 The Court's appli-
cation of Eighth Amendment protection to the civil arena was based 
on its determination that civil in rem forfeiture had historically been 
understood to constitute governmentally imposed punishment. 80 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that civil in rem 
forfeiture deprives property owners of their property rights as a 
deterrent and as punishment for criminal activity, 81 Further, the Court 
noted that the existence of innocent owner provisions revealed that 
the true focus of civil in rem forfeiture was on the culpability of the 
owner and that Congress intended only to punish those guilty of 
criminal activity,82 Determining that the drug forfeiture statutes at 
issue83 constituted punishment, the Court noted that they tied for-
feiture to an underlying drug offens~ and that the legislative history 
of the statute indicated congressional intent to use forfeiture as a 
deterrent. 85 The Austin Court concluded that in the presence of these 
. factors, forfeiture, under the statutes at issue, "constitute[d] 'pay-
ment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense,"'86 and was, 
74. Id. at 264. 
75. Sex! id. 
76. Id at 268. 
77. See id. at 262. 
78. See id. at 265. 
79. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993); see also supra note 6. 
80. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 618; see also supra notes 21-58 and accompanying 
text. 
81. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 618. 
82. See id. at 619. 
83. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) & (a)(7) (1994); see also supra note 6. 
84. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620. 
85. Sex! id. 
86. Id at 622 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 
U.S. 257, 265 (1989». 
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therefore, "subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's 
Excessive Fines Clause. "87 
Q. Tests jor Excessiveness 
While holding that the Eighth Amendment applied to civil in 
rem forfeiture, the Austin Court declined to fashion- a test for 
determining excessiveness. 88 Justice Scalia, in a lone concurring opin-
ion, articulated a test that has been termed the "instrumentality 
test. "89 In remanding Austin for a determination of excessiveness, 
the Court did not, however, limit the lower court from considering 
factors other than Justice Scalia's proposed instrumentality test.90 
Because of the lack of direction given by the majority, federal district 
and circuit courts have developed their own tests.91 While these tests 
are far from uniform, they tend to emphasize either an "instrumen-
tality" or a "proportionality" approach. A minority of federal 
circuits have fashioned tests based on Justice Scalia's instrumentality 
proposal which focus on the connection between the property and 
the underlying drug offense. 92 The majority of federal circuits, how-
ever, have given great weight to the Austin Court's failure to adopt 
Justice Scalia's test.93 These circuits have fashioned tests that require 
the value of forfeited property to be proportional to the underlying 
criminal activity. 94 
87.Id 
88. S~ id. 
89. S~ id. at 623-28. 
90. See id. "Justice Scalia suggests that the sole measure of an in rem forfeiture's 
excessiveness is the relationship between the forfeited property and the of-
fense .... We do not rule out the possibility that the connection between the 
property and the offense may be relevant, but our decision today in no way 
limits the Court of Appeals from considering other factors in determining ... 
excessiveness." Id. at 623 n.15. 
91. See infra notes 92, 94 and accompanying text. 
92. Three circuits have adopted the instrumentality test: the Ninth Circuit, United 
States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1995), the Seventh 
Circuit, United States v. Plescia, 48 F.3d 1452 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. 
Ct. 114 (1995), and the Fourth Circuit, United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 
358 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1792 (1995). See also infra notes 
139-44 and accompanying text (discussing 6380 Little Canyon Rd.), notes 99-
104 and accompanying text (discussing Plescia), notes 108-34 and accompanying 
text (discussing Chandler). 
93. See supra note 90. 
94. Five circuits have followed this approach. See United States v. Milbrand, 58 
F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding factors to be considered include: harshness 
of forfeiture in comparison to gravity of offense and sentence that could have 
been imposed; relationship between the property and the offense; and role and 
degree of culpability of the owner of the property), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 
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i. The Instrumentality Test 
The threshold question of the instrumentality test, as announced 
by Justice Scalia, is whether there is a close enough relationship 
between the property and the offense "to render the property, under 
traditional standards, 'guilty' and hence forfeitable."9s Thus, in 
determining excessiveness, federal courts are considered to have 
adopted an instrumentality test if the test's threshold factor focuses 
on the nexus between the property and the offense.96 
The extent of the connection required, however, varies from 
circuit to circuit. 97 Several circuits also· require that other factors be 
considered once a substantial nexus between the offense and the 
property has been established.98 The only uniformity between the 
various instrumentality tests is that the instrumentality requirement 
is the threshold factor to be considered in determining excessiveness. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is 
the sole jurisdiction, to date, to apply an absolute instrumentality 
test. 99 In United States v. Plescialoo the government seized a defen-
1284 (1996); United States v. Rural Route I, Box 137-B, 24 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 
1994) (holding petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
forfeiture is grossly disproportionate to offense committed); United States v. 
Myers, 21 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 1994) (adopting proportionality analysis requiring 
a fact specific evaluation of all the circumstances of defendant's criminal 
conduct, including the extent of criminal drug activities, in order to determine 
excessiveness), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 742 (1995); United States v. 18755 N. 
Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1994) (adopting proportionality analysis -
measure seriousness of offense by examining whether illegal conduct, associated 
with the property, was the type Congress intended to punish); United States 
v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding defendant required to make 
prima facie showing that forfeiture is not grossly disproportionate); United 
States v. 429 S. Main St., 843 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (holding primary 
factor to consider is gravity of offense, measured by harmful reach of crime 
and sentence allowable under statute, as compared to the value of the forfeiture; 
other factors may include extent of property's use and whether family home), 
ajf'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 52 F.3d 1416 (6th Cir. 1995); see 
also infra notes 262-68 and accompanying text. 
95. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 628 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
96. See supra note 92. 
97. Compare United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 
1994) (requiring a substantial connection between the property and the under-
lying offense) with United States v. Plescia, 48 F.3d 1452, 1462 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(holding forfeiture is appropriate if used in any way to facilitate drug offenses 
as long as the use is not "incidental or fortuitous") (citing United States v. 
916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 493 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 
114 (1995». 
98. See notes 92-143 and accompanying text. 
99. See United States v. Plescia, 48 F.3d 1452, 1462 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 
S. Ct. 114 (1995). 
100. Id 
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dant's home on the basis of one phone call between codefendants, 
the purpose of which was to set up a large cocaine transaction. lOl 
The court found that the forfeiture was not excessive because the 
property was deliberately, as opposed to fortuitously, used to facil-
itate a drug transaction.I02 Expressly adopting Justice Scalia's instru-
mentality analysis, 103 the court found that the connection between 
the property and the offense was close enough to warrant forfeiture 
regardless of the value of the property.l04 
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits apply a multi-tiered instrumen-
tality approach. lOS The Fourth Circuit analysis expressly rejects the 
applicability of proportionality analysis,l06 yet allows additional fac-
tors to be considered once a nexus between the property and the 
offense has been established. Conversely, the Ninth Circuit employs 
a proportionality analysis, but only if a substantial nexus has been 
established between the property and the underlying criminal activ-
ity.l07 Thus, both are considered instrumentality tests because of their 
nexus requirement, and both employ a multi-tiered approach because 
they apply other factors to determine excessiveness once the nexus is 
satisfied. 
The instrumentality test was adopted by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as the "appropriate standard for 
determining excessiveness" in United States v. Chandler. lOS In Chan-
dler, evidence was presented at the forfeiture proceeding that a thirty-
three acre farm, valued at $569,000, was the situs of at least 130 
drug transactions. 109 There was also testimony that farm employees 
were paid for their labors in drugs rather than in cash. 11O The trial 
court found probable cause that the property facilitated the drug 
activity and was thus subject to forfeiture. 111 The burden of proof 
then shifted to the claimant to show either that the property was not 
used as a site for drug transactions, or that the owner was unaware 
of the illegal activity.1I2 The jury found that the property was used 
to facilitate drug activity, that it was improved by proceeds of the 
drug exchanges, and that the property owner was aware of the drug 
101. See id. 
102. See id. 
103. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
104. See Plescia, 48 F.3d at 1462. 
105. See infra notes 106-44 and accompanying text. 
106. See United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 360 (4th Cir. 1994). 
107. See United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1994); see 
also supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text. 
108. 36 F.3d 358, 360 (4th Cir. 1994). 
109. See id. at 360, 366. 
110. See id. at 361. 
111. See id. 
112. See id. 
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dealings. 113 The entire farm was ordered forfeited, and the owner 
appealed on the grounds that the forfeiture was excessive.114 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit first established the appropriate 
standard by which to ascertain whether or not a forfeiture violates 
the Excessive Fines Clause. I1S In promulgating its test the court 
recognized the historical premise that in rem forfeiture is grounded 
on the legal fiction that the "property itself was considered the 
'offender."'116 Further, the court found that the drug forfeiture 
statute at issue 117 "did not intend to punish or fine by a particular 
amount or value; instead, it intended to punish by forfeiting property 
of whatever value which was tainted by the offense."118 Thus, the 
Chandler court held that the central question of excessiveness is the 
role of the property and the extent of its use in the furtherance of 
the underlying offense. 119 
The focus of the Chandler test is on the property and its role 
in the offense.l20 The factor given the greatest weight, the nexus 
between the property and the offense, is determined by considering 
several specific factors, none of which are dispositive: (1) whether 
the property's use was deliberate; (2) whether the property's use was 
important to the success of the crime; (3) the time during which the 
property was used and the spatial extent of its use; (4) whether the 
use was an isolated incident or the property has been used more 
than once; and (5) whether the property was acquired, maintained, 
or used with the purpose of carrying out the crime.121 
The court recognized, however, that civil in rem forfeiture exacts 
a punishment on the owner of the property. 122 Acknowledging the 
punitive aspect of such forfeitures, the court provided that the role 
of the property owner, while of "minor relevance," should also be 
considered.123 "Thus, where the owner's involvement in the offense 
is only incidental, as opposed to extensive - e.g., where he is simply 
1l3. See id. 
114. See id. at 361-62. 
115. See id. at 363. 
116. Id. 
117. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
118. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 364. Although the Chandler court acknowledged that 
forfeiture exacted punishment on the property owner, it dismissed both the 
value of the property and the gravity of the underlying offense as factors to 
be weighed in an excessiveness analysis. See id. The value of the property and 
the gravity of the offense are factors often employed under the proportionality 
test. See infra notes 145-84 and accompanying text. 
119. See Chandler, 36 F.3d at 364. 
120. See id. 
121. Sei id. at 365. 
122. See id. at 364. 
123. See id. 
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aware of the offense but not a perpetrator or conspirator this 
fact will weigh on the excessiveness side of the scales. "124 This element 
operates to mitigate the harshness of forfeiture if the property owner 
can show that his role in the underlying criminal activity was minimal. 
The court was also concerned that only "tainted" property be 
subject to forfeiture. 125 The Chandler court provided that if the 
property owner could prove that readily separable parcels were not 
implicated in the underlying offense, they could be saved from 
forfeiture.126 The burden of proving separability, however, rested 
with the property owner. 127 
The Fourth Circuit then applied the above factors to the facts 
presented at trial.l28 The court found that the secluded nature of the 
property was important to the success of the illegal activity.129 Fur-
thermore, the number of transactions that occurred on the property 
and the extensive use of the property for drug storage increased the 
culpability of the property.l3° The court also found that the property 
was partially maintained and improved by payments to farm workers 
made with drugs. 131 Thus, the requisite nexus between the property 
and the drug activity was overwhelmingly satisfied.132 Turning to the 
remaining two factors, the court was unpersuaded that the property 
owner's role was incidental. The court also noted that no evidence 
was presented that the property was separable. 133 Thus, the court 
concluded that the entire thirty-three acre farm had been properly 
forfeited and that the excessive fines clause was not offended. 134 
The Chandler test is a two-tiered approach to civil in rem 
forfeiture actions. First, the establishment of the requisite nexus 
between the property and the offense determines whether a forfeiture 
can properly be imposed. 135 Second, the extent of the property 
owner's involvement and the separability of the offending property 
are factors that relate directly to the excessiveness of the "fine. "136 
Hence, where property is clearly implicated through its use in criminal 
activity, its forfeiture may be excessive if the owner can prove that 
the owner's role is "incidental, as opposed to extensive" or if 
124. Id. 
125. See id. 
126. See id. 
127. See id. at 366. 
128. See id. 
129. See id. 
130. See id. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. at 364. 
136. See id. 
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"nonimplicated" property is not separated, where possible, from 
offending property. 137 This analysis is less harsh than the Plescia 
test.138 Its multi-factored approach affords more protection to the 
property owner as it considers the extent of the property's use and 
role of the owner in the underlying criminal activity in its determi-
nation of excessiveness. 
A slightly different two-tiered approach was adopted by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States 
v. 6380 Little Canyon Road. 139 To determine whether the forfeiture 
is proper, the Ninth Circuit applies the instrumentality test which 
requires the government to show a substantial connection between 
the gUilty property and the underlying criminal offense. l40 Once the 
government has satisfied its burden, the court applies a proportion-
ality prong as "a check on the instrumentality approach." 141 Thus, 
once the instrumentality requirement is satisfied the "worth of the 
property must be 'proportional' (not excessive) to the culpability of 
the owner."142 Under this model, property that is extensively used 
for criminal purposes may be saved from forfeiture if the court 
determines that the harshness of the forfeiture l43 exceeds the culpa-
bility of the owner .144 
ii. The Multi-Factor Proportionality Test 
The multi-factor proportionality approach recognizes both the 
in personam and in rem characteristics of civil in rem forfeiture. 
This approach stems from analogizing the Supreme Court's treatment 
137. Id. 
138. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text. 
139. 59 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 1994). 
140. See id. at 985. This approach of shifting the burden of proof to the non-
claiming party differs from the rest of the circuits which have addressed this 
issue. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
141. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d at 983. The proportionality prong is applied 
in recognition of the potential harshness of civil in rem forfeiture. See id. 
142. Id. at 982. 
143. The Ninth Circuit considered the following factors in determining the harshness 
of the forfeiture: (1) the fair market value of the property; (2) the subjective 
value of the property (whether it is the family home, etc.); and (3) the hardship 
to the claimant, taking into account the effect of the forfeiture on the claimant's 
family or financial condition. See id. at 985. 
144. The culpability of the owner is determined by considering the following factors: 
(1) whether the owner was reckless or negligent in allowing the property to be 
used for criminal activity; (2) whether the owner was directly involved in the 
criminal activity and the extent of the involvement; and (3) the harm caused 
by the illegal activity measured by the amount of drugs involved, the duration 
of the activity, and the effect of the crime on the community. See id. at 986. 
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of parallel clauses contained in the Eighth Amendment. 145 The ap-
proach utilized in determining violations of the Eighth Amendment, 146 
in regard to the Excessive Bail and Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clauses,147 forms the basis for the proportionality test. 148 Recognizing 
that there are "parallel limitations" imposed "on bail, fines and 
other punishments,' '149 courts have synthesized and applied the Su-
preme Court's treatment of the Excessive Bail l50 and Cruel and 
Unusual PunishmentlSI Clauses to the Excessive Fines Clause. 152 While 
the actual tests adopted by the various courts are far from uniform, 153 
the element common to all is the requirement that the moral gravity 
of the offense be weighed against the harshness of the forfeiture. 154 
145. See Douglas S. Reinhart. Applying the Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeiture 
After Austin v. United States: Excessiveness and Proportionality. 36 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 235. 252-53 (1994) (noting that analysis of the Excessive Fines 
Clause should be similar to that required by the Excessive Bail Clause and the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause). 
146. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also supra note 1 for the text of the Eighth 
Amendment. 
147. See supra note 1. 
148. See Reinhart. supra note 145. at 264. 
149. Solem v. Helm. 463 U.S. 277. 289 (1983). 
150. "[f)he Excessive Fines Clause should be read to employ a proportionality 
standard as does the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Excessive Bail 
Clause. in which the Court reads 'excessive' to require proportionality between 
the amount of bail and the 'interest the Government seeks to protect,' i.e .• 
the risk of flight." United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd .• 59 F.3d 974. 983 
(9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Salerno. 481 U.S. 739. 754 (1987); 
Stack v. Boyle. 342 U.S. 1. 5 (1951». . 
151. "[f)he mode for determining whether a fine is 'excessive' would be similar or 
virtually identical to that employed to determine whether a punishment was 
'cruel [and) unusual ... • United States v. Sarbello. 985 F.2d 716. 725 n.16 (3d 
Cir. 1993). 
152. See United States v. 11869 Westshore Dr.. 70 F.3d 923. 927-28 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(tracing the evolution of the proportionality test). 
153. See infra notes 155. 156. 259. 272 and accompanying text. 
154. See infra notes 155. 156. 259. 272 and accompanying text. This element can 
be traced to the Supreme Court's holding in Solem v. Helm. 463 U.S. 277. 
303 (1983). In Solem. the Court defined the limitation of the Eighth Amend-
ment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See id. The defendant had been 
convicted of six prior nonviolent felonies when he was convicted of "uttering 
a 'no account'" check in the amount of $100. Id. at 281. The Court found 
that the sentence imposed pursuant to a recidivist statute. life in prison without 
the opportunity of parole. was "grossly disproportionate" and violated the 
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 288. 302. In order to clarify what was meant by 
grossly disproportionate. the Court established a three factor proportionality 
analysis: (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) 
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) sentences 
imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. See id. at 292. It is the first 
of these factors that has almost uniformly been applied in determination of 
whether a forfeiture is proportionately excessive. See, e.g .• United States v. 
11869 Westshore Dr .• 70 F.3d 923. 927-28 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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Additional factors commonly employed quantify the gravity of the 
underlying criminal involvement ISS and the harshness of the forfeiturels6 
as they relate to the property ownerlS7 and the extent and nature of 
the property's use. IS8 
Representative of the proportionality approach is the test put 
forth in United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive.IS9 In Zumirez, the 
Government sought forfeiture of a single family home, valued in 
excess of $600,000, from which $15,200 of cocaine had been seized. l60 
The owner of the property had been acquitted of criminal charges; 
however, his son, 'an occupant of the home, had been found guilty 
of numerous drug offenses.161 Seeking forfeiture, the Government 
alleged that the owner permitted his son to use the property for 
illegal drug activity. 162 
The Zumirez court adopted a -three factor proportionality test 
balancing: (1) whether the inherent gravity of the offense outweighed 
the harshness of the penalty; (2) whether the property was an integral 
part of the commission of the crime; and (3) whether the criminal 
activity involving the property was extensive in terms of time and 
spatial use.163 The focus of the first factor is on the conduct of the 
claimant, while the focus of the second and third factors is on the 
instrumentality of the property. 164 
155. See, e.g., United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd. 13 F.3d 1493, 1498-99 (llth Cir. 
1994) (measuring seriousness of offense by examining whether underlying illegal 
conduct was type Congress intended to punish); United States v. Shelly's 
Riverside Heights Lot X, 851 F. Supp. 633, 638 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (measuring 
gravity of the crime by its harmful reach and benefits accrued through illegal 
activity); United States v; 429 S. Main St., 843 F. Supp. 337, 341-42 (S.D. 
Ohio 1993) (measuring gravity of the offense by harmful reach of the crime 
and sentence allowable under the corresponding criminal statute), a/I'd in part, 
remanded on other grounds, 52 F.3d 1416 (6th Cir. 1995). 
156. See, e.g., Shelly's Riverside Heights Lot X, 851 F. Supp. at 638 (measuring 
harshness by significance of the seized asset to the claimant); 429 S. Main St., 
843 F. Supp. at 341-42 (requiring harshness to take into account whether 
property seized is a family home). 
157. The emphasis on the owner of the property makes the in rem analysis more 
akin to the analysis undertaken for in personam forfeiture. See supra notes 
32-33 and accompanying text. 
158. The extent of the property's use relates directly to its instrumentality. See 
United States v. Zumirez, 845 F. Supp. 725, 732 (C.D. Cal. 1994). 
159. 845 F. Supp. at 725-42. The Zumirez court expressly rejected the "Solem 
approach," yet expressly incorporated the first element of the Solem test. See 
id at 731-32. 
160. See id. at 730. 
161. See id. 
162. See id. 
163. See id. at 732. 
164. See id. at 733-34. 
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The application of the first factor requires a two step analysis. 
First, the inherent gravity of the claimant's conduct is evaluated 
based on whether the claimant was convicted of the criminal act 
underlying the forfeiture, the claimant was never charged with any 
crime, or the claimant was charged and acquitted of the underlying 
criminal offense. 165 When the property owner has not been convicted 
of the underlying offense, "the court must be careful to focus only 
on the inherent gravity of the offensive conduct engaged in by the 
claimant himself, rather than on the inherent gravity of the offense 
or offenses that the government had probable cause to believe were 
committed on the property. "166 Second, the harshness of the forfei-
ture is evaluated by considering the monetary value of the interest 
held in the property, as well as such intangibles as the typel67 and 
characterl68 of the property. 169 
The second factor is derived from the traditional treatment of 
civil in rem forfeiture. 170 The relevant inquiry is whether the property 
has a close enough relationship to the underlying offense to render 
it guilty, and hence, forfeitable. 17I Finally, the application of the 
third factor involves a determination of the spatial extent of the 
property's use, and "whether the defendant property played an 
extensive or pervasive role in the commission of the crime."172 
The Zumirez court applied the above factors to the forfeiture 
action and held that it was excessive.173 The court noted that the 
property owner had been charged and acquitted of the underlying 
drug offense. 174 Focusing its inquiry on the owner's offensive behav-
ior, the court found that the lack of direct involvement in the drug 
activity and the familial relationship between the offender and the 
owner significantly reduced the gravity of the owner's acts. 175 In 
evaluating the harshness of the forfeiture, the court recognized that 
165. See ide at 733. 
166. Id. 
167. The Zumirez court noted that society places a higher value on real versus 
personal property. See ide at 734. 
168. The Zumirez court specifically mentioned the increased value society places on 
the home as opposed to personal property. See ide (citing United States v. 
James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. 492, 505 (1993); Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 601 (1980». 
169. See ide 
170. See ide 
171. See id.; see also supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
172. Zumirez, 845 F. Supp. at 734. The court found that the analysis for this factor 
should follow that used by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. United States, 
500 U.S. 544, 559 (1993). See supra note 33. 
173. See Zumirez, 845 F. Supp. at 742. 
174. See ide at 735. 
175. See ide at 736. 
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the loss of a horne, owned and maintained for over twenty years, 
was "unquestionably ... severe," especially in light of the owner's 
acquittal.I76 The court concluded that the forfeiture of the home 
"greatly exceed[ed] that which would be appropriate in light of the 
offensive behavior involved." 177 
Further, the court found that the property's only link to the 
criminal activity was its use as a site for drug sales.178 The location 
of the home did not facilitate the drug activity, nor did it "provide 
a cloak of legitimacy to the illegal drug traffickers who frequented 
the house." 179 Without more of a connection, the court declined to 
find that the property was integral to the commission of a crime, 
and the horne was deemed not to be an instrument of illegal activity. 180 
Thus, forfeiture of the property would not further the goal of ridding 
society of the instrumentalities of drug activity. 
As to the spatial and temporal use of the property, the court 
found the government's evidence relating to the time frame during 
which the property was used to be sparse. 181 The extent of the use, 
however, was substantial as drugs were found in five bedrooms and 
an exterior shed.182 The court emphasized that this was the only 
factor of the proportionality test that was satisfied. 183 Taking all the 
factors into consideration, the court held that forfeiture of the 
property would violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment.l84 
The proportionality approach differs significantly from the in-
strumentality approach. The central focus of the proportionality test 
is on the behavior of the owner of the property with only secondary 
consideration given to the property's role in the criminal activity. 185 
This is in sharp contrast to the instrumentality test which emphasizes 
the role of the property and only looks to the owner's lack of 
culpability as a limiting factor .186 
2. Maryland's Prohibition Against Excessive Fines 
Prior to Aravanis v. Somerset County,187 Maryland's high court 
had never applied the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amend-
176. [d. at 737. 
177. [d. 
178. See id. at 738. 
179. [d. at 737. 
180. See id. at 738. 
181. See id. 
182. See id. 
183. See id. 
184. See id. 
185. See supra notes 145-84 and accompanying text. 
186. See supra notes 95-144 and accompanying text. 
187. 339 Md. 644, 664 A.2d 888 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996). 
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ment or article 25 to a civil in rem forfeiture. Indeed, the Eighth 
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause was only peripherally188 applied 
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Randall Book Corp. v. 
State. 189 
Randall Book Corp. involved the imposition of 116 separate 
fines, totalling $58,000, arising out of obscenity law infractions.l90 
The defendant corporation challenged these fines as a "claim of an 
illegal sentence." 191 Accordingly, the court analyzed the fines under 
a framework loosely based on that employed in cruel and unusual 
punishment challenges.192 The court recognized, however, that the 
penalties imposed on the defendant were fines. 193 
In reaching its decision, the court undertook a proportionality 
analysis comparing the aggregate fine imposed, with the gravity of 
the offense.l94 Recognizing that the defendant corporation had a 
history of similar enforcement action and profited from the sales of 
such materials, and that the fines were below the statutory maximum 
permitted by the legislature, the court concluded that the fines did 
not constitute "excessive fine[s] ... within the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment. " 195 
III. THE INSTANT CASE 
In 1971, George Joseph Aravanis (Aravanis), appellant, and his 
wife, took title, as tenants by the entireties, to a Maryland farm.l96 
They used this property as their family home until their separation. l97 
Aravanis continued to occupy the property, as originally titled, until 
1991 when part of the property was sold.198 Following this sale, 
Aravanis took sole title to the remaining house and land as his share 
of the proceeds, receiving $16,000, a portion of which was used to 
purchase marijuana for distribution purposes. l99 
188. See id. at 657 n.l0, 664 A.2d at 894 n.1O (1995). 
189. 316 Md. 315, 332, 558 A.2d 715, 724 (1989). 
190. See id. at 319, 558 A.2d at 717. 
191. Id. at 322, 558 A.2d at 719. 
192. See id. at 331, 558 A.2d at 723. The court expressly referred to Solem v. 
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), but declined to apply the full test to the facts of 
the case. Randall Book Corp., 316 Md. at 330, 558 A.2d at 723. For a 
discussion of the Solem test see supra note 154. 
193. See Randall Book Corp., 316 Md. at 319, 329-32, 559 A.2d at 717, 722-24. 
194. See id. at 330-31, 559 A.2d at 723. 
195. Id at 332, 559 A.2d at 724. 
196. Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 646, 664 A.2d 888, 889 (1995), 
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996). The farm was located at 5341 Shelltown 
Road in Westover, Somerset County, Maryland. See id. 
197. See id. 
198. See id. 
199. See id. at 646-47, 664 A.2d at 889. 
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In July of 1991, a search and seizure warrant was executed on 
Aravanis's property and approximately two pounds of marijuana and 
several items commonly used in the drug trade were seized.200 Prior 
to the search, it was established that Aravanis gave a large quantity 
of marijuana to a family member, had sold large quantities of 
marijuana to two individuals on at least three occasions, and had 
made two controlled sales of marijuana, from the residence, during 
the weeks just prior to the search. 201 Aravanis pled guilty to one 
count of possession of a controlled dangerous substance pursuant to 
Section 286 of Article 27 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. 202 
Thereafter, the forfeiture proceeding at issue was filed by the State. 203 
Prosecutors sought forfeiture of Aravanis's farm pursuant to 
Maryland's drug forfeiture statute:204 The State argued that because 
the property was used in connection with his underlying drug of-
fense, lOS it was subject to forfeiture.206 Aravanis maintained that the 
forfeiture of his home was excessive for two months of drug deal-
ing.207 The trial court, however, found that the property had been 
200. See id. The paraphernalia seized included sandwich baggies and a set of triple 
beam scales. See id. 
201. See id. at 647 n.3, 664 A.2d at 889 n.3. 
202. See id. at 647, 664 A.2d at 889. Section 286 of Article 27 of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland states, in relevant part: 
Unlawful manufacture, distribution, etc.; counterfeiting, etc.; manu-
facture, possession, etc., of certain equipment for illegal use; keeping 
common nuisance. (a) Except as authorized by this subheading, it is 
unlawful for any person: (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, 
or to possess a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient quantity 
to reasonably indicate under all circumstances an intent to manufac-
ture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286 (1996). 
203. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 648, 664 A.2d at 890. 
204. See id. at 649, 664 A.2d at 890 (citing § 297); see also supra notes 9, 65-67 
and accompanying text. 
205. Aravanis "pled guilty to one count of possession of a controlled dangerous 
substance in sufficient quantity to indicate an intent to manufacture, distribute, 
or dispense pursuant to Article 27, § 286." Aravanis, 339 Md. at 647, 664 
A.2d at 889; see also supra note 202. 
206. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 649, 664 A.2d at 890. 
207. See id. at 650, 664 A.2d at 891. Aravanis also argued, unsuccessfully, that 
pursuant to section 297(1) of article 27: (1) the state had failed to establish, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that the property had been purchased during 
the time of his illegal activity; and (2) the state had failed to establish that 
there was no other fiscal source for the acquisition of the property. See id. at 
648, 664 A.2d at 890. The trial court concurred with the State that the forfeiture 
was controlled by section 297(m), and that section 297(1) was inapplicable. See 
id. at 649-50, 664 A.2d at 890. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, recognized 
that section 297(1) is only invoked when there are questions as to the actual 
owner of the property. See id. at 649 n.8, 664 A.2d at 890 n.8. Accordingly, 
a rebuttable presumption was established that property owned by an individual 
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used in connection with the distribution of marijuana and, therefore, 
satisfied the requirements of the forfeiture statute.2OS Finding that no 
exceptions to the statute were met, the trial court ordered the property 
forfeited to the State. 209 Aravanis filed an appeal to the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland; however, prior to consideration by 
that court, the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari on 
its own motion.21D 
Aravanis challenged the forfeiture of his home on constitutional 
grounds, claiming that the taking of his property was excessive -
in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Article 25 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights.211 Aravanis based his Eighth Amendment 
challenge on the Supreme Court's holding in Austin v. United States212 
and asserted that the Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 213 
A. The Application oj Austin 
The Aravanis court followed the model set forth in Austin214 by 
first determining if the drug forfeiture statute at issue, article 27 
section 297(m),2IS constituted punishment.216 These factors include: 
(1) whether the statute has historically been understood to punish;217 
(2) whether an innocent owner provision is included within the 
statute;218 (3) whether the statute at issue tied forfeiture to a statutorily 
proscribed drug offense;219 and (4) whether the legislative history of 
who has violated the relevant drug statutes are proceeds of criminal activity. 
Upon the State's showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the property 
was acquired while engaged in illegal drug activity and there was no other 
likely source for such property, the property is forfeitable. See id. at 649 n.6, 
664 A.2d at 890 n.6 (citing § 297(1). Maryland's high court did not dispute 
the trial court's findings with respect to Aravanis's section 297(1) claim, and 
turned its attention to Aravanis's constitutional claim. See id. at 651, 664 A.2d 
at 891. 
208. See id. at 650, 664 A.2d at 891. 
209. See id. 
210. See id. at 651, 664 A.2d at 891. 
211. See id.; see also supra notes 1 and 13. 
212. 5<9 U.S. 602 (1993). 
213. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 650, 664 A.2d at 891. Stating that article 25 is in 
pari materia with the Eighth Amendment, Aravanis maintained that in the 
eventuality that Maryland's high court did not find the Eighth Amendment 
applicable, article 25's prohibition of excessive fines must be applied. See id. 
214. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text. 
215. See supra note 9. 
216. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 651-55, 664 A.2d at 891-93. 
217. See Austin 509 U.S. at 618. 
218. See id. 
219. See supra note 6. 
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the statute indicated legislative intent that forfeiture serve as a 
deterrent. 220 The presence of these factors in the forfeiture statute at· 
issue would "constitute 'payment to a sovereign as punishment for 
some offense," '221 and would, therefore, be subject to constitutional 
limitations. 222 
The Aravanis court held that although section 297 is a civil 
action in rem, it is the type of statute that has "'historically been 
understood, at least in part, to [punishJ."'223 The court also observed 
that section 297(m), like the forfeiture statutes at issue in Austin,224 
contains an innocent owner defense.22s Moreover, the court found 
that the third element of tying the forfeiture to a drug offense was 
satisfied because section 297 expressly refers to various illegal drug 
activities that trigger the statute. 226 Finally, the Aravanis court noted 
that the state legislature intended the statute to serve as a deterrence 
to drug actlvity.227 Thus, having satisfied the elements set forth in 
Austin, the court held that section 297, and subsection (m) in 
particular, were punitive in nature. 228 
The Aravanis court then set forth broad parameters under which 
civil in rem forfeitures should be evaluated for excessiveness.229 
Maryland's high court adopted a hybrid test for excessiveness230 
incorporating both an "instrumentality test"231 and a "proportion-
ality test." 232 The court did not, however, propose that its analysis 
be a "precise formula.' '233 Rather, the court deferred to the trial 
judges to determine "the weighing of factors appropriate to each 
individual case." 234 
In determining the factors for the instrumentality prong, the 
court examined the Fourth Circuit's decision in Chandler.235 The 
Aravanis court found the Chandler test to be "a forceful and well 
220. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 619-20. 
22l. Id. at 622 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 
257, 265 (1989». 
222. See id. 
223. Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 652, 664 A.2d 888, 892 (1995) 
(quoting Austin, 509 U.S. at 612), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996). 
224. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) & (a)(7); see also supra note 6. 
225. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 654, 664 A.2d at 893. 
226. See id. at 655, 664 A.2d at 893. 
227. See id. 
228. See id. 
229. See id. at 657-65, 664 A.2d at 894-98. 
230. See id. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898. 
23l. See supra notes 95-144 and accompanying text. 
232. See supra notes 145-84 and accompanying text. 
233. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898. 
234. Id at 666, 664 A.2d at 899. 
235. 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1792 (1995); see also 
supra notes 108-38 and accompanying text. 
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articulated defense of the instrumentality test''236 and determined that 
the Chandler test provides a "sound basis for evaluating the rela-
tionship between the property and the illegal activity. "237 
Additionally, the Aravanis court mandated that the property 
owner's culpability, regarding the underlying offense, also be consid-
ered in determining excessiveness.238 The court noted that the plain 
meaning of "excessive," coupled with the determination that civil 
forfeiture is punishment for an offense, required that excessiveness 
analysis focus on the owner of the property. 239 The court maintained 
that failure to inquire into the effect of the forfeiture on the owner 
conflates the constitutional excessive fines analysis with the statute's 
nexus requirement and ignores that forfeiture has, as its object, some 
person.240 According to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, "[i]t is 
appropriate, therefore, that the owner's culpability with respect to 
the underlying criminal activity be considered." 241 
In its proportionality analysis, the court examined, but fell short 
of adopting, the test set forth in Zumirez.242 Rather, the court 
identified a "non-exclusive" 243 list of factors to be considered: the 
enormity of the loss to the owner; the gravity, scope, and duration 
of the illegal activity; and the culpability of the owner.244 Addition-
ally, the state may show the profit gleaned from the illegal activity 
"because that fact bears on the question of how much the owner 
actually loses by the forfeiture." 245 The court did not intend, however, 
to limit the lower courts to this list of factors.246 Rather, the court 
deliberately reserved the identification and weighing of the relevant 
factors to the discretion of the trial court. 247 
Thus, the Aravanis court laid out a loose framework under 
which excessive fine analysis is to be applied.248 Instrumentality is to 
be determined under the factors of the Chandler test. 249 Trial courts 
236. Aruvanis, 339 Md. at 661, 664 A.2d at 896. 
237. Id. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898. 
238. Sa! id. at 664, 664 A.2d at 898. 
239. See id. 
240. See id. at 664-65, 664 A.2d at 898 (citing United States v. 9638 Chicago 
Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1994». 
241. Id. at 664, 664 A.2d at 898. 
242. See id. at 662-64, 664 A.2d at 897-98; see a/so supra notes 159-84 and 
accompanying text. 
243. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 666, 664 A.2d at 898. 
244. See id. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898. 
245. Id. at 665 n.16, 664 A.2d at 898 n.16. The court stated that such profits may 
be shown directly, or indirectly. See id. 
246. Sa! id. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898. 
247. See id. at 665-66, 664 A.2d at 898-99. 
248. Sa! id. 
249. Sa! id. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898. 
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are also required to consider' 'factors of proportionality that compare 
the gravity of the offense . . . with the enormity of the loss to the 
owner occasioned by the forfeiture. "250 The court did not undertake 
any further analysis. Rather, it remanded the case to the trial court 
for a determination of whether the forfeiture at bar violated the 
Excessive Fines Clause of article 25. 251 Therefore, as the Supreme 
Court had in Austin, the Maryland high court held that civil in rem 
forfeiture was subject to the protections of excessiveness analysis, 
yet refused to apply a test to the instant case or even to definitively 
promulgate a test. 
IV . ANALYSIS 
The Aravanis court established broad guidelines for Maryland 
lower courts. 252 It did not, however, apply any of the factors it laid 
out to the facts of the case. The court's failure to endorse, and 
apply, a specific test may lead to confusion and non uniformity. 
Additionally, the court's determination that section 297 is punitive 
may invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States ·ConstitutiOIY53 because convicted felons who are 
subjected to forfeiture proceedings may assert they are being punished 
twice for the same offense. 254 
A. Aravanis Did Not Provide a Clear Test of Excessiveness 
The Supreme Court's failure to define a test for excessiveness 
in Austin has engendered much confusion in the lower federal and 
state courts.2SS This confusion may well be repeated in Maryland. 
Had the Aravanis court dealt directly with the merits of the case, or 
more definitively supported a set test, such a result could have been 
avoided. 
Maryland's high court endorsed, but failed to clearly define the 
role of the Fourth Circuit's Chandler test. 256 Is it a threshold deter-
mination, or is it just one factor to be considered under a totality 
of the circumstances? Further, confusion may reign as lower courts 
are forced to grapple with defining, weighing, and applying a host 
of proportionality factors to civil in rem forfeitures. 
250. Id 
251. See id. at 666, 664 A.2d at 899. 
252. See id. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898; see also supra notes 229-51 and accompanying 
text. 
253. See supra note 20 for the text of the Fifth Amendment. 
254. See Allen v. State, 91 Md. App. 775, 605 A.2d 994 (1992). 
255. See supra notes 18, 92, 94. 
256. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text. 
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The court failed to provide guidance to the lower courts as to 
the meanings of "gravity of the offense," "enormity of the loss," 
and "degree of the owner's culpability."257 Indeed, the court's defi-
nition of proportionality - "it means simply that there must be a 
comparison of the extent of the loss to the relevant factors involved, 
including the gravity and extent of the illegal activity, the nexus 
between that conduct and the subject property, and the extent of 
involvement of the ownermS8 - includes nexus and involvement 
requirements that arguably have been measured under the Chandler· 
test. 2S9 Thus, the high court provided the lower courts with conflict-
ing, ill defined criteria from which a test must be adduced and 
applied. 
1. A Test for All Seasons 
While much can be learned from the Austin decision about the 
dangers of failing to provide lower courts with an adequate frame-
work, the plethora of tests that have been formulated offer an 
opportunity to choose a test that provides defined factors that are 
relatively easily applied. The tests promulgated in United States v. 
429 South Main Street260 and United States v. SheUy's Riverside 
Heights Lot XU) provide elements that are quantifiable, and hence 
workable. 
In 429 South Main Street, the claimant had sold an increasing 
amount of marijuana on three separate occasions, once in the alley 
behind his home and twice on the premises. 262 In upholding the 
forfeiture of property, valued at $83,700, the court concentrated on 
the objective gravity of the owner's conviction for marijuana sales 
totaling ninety-five dollars.263 The gravity of the owner's offense was 
measured by looking at two factors. First, the court found that, 
because the drug sales were not a one-time occurrence, and the 
amount sold increased with each transaction, the behavior of the 
257. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898. 
258. [d. 
259. The Chandler test "considers (1) the nexus between the offense and the property 
and the extent of the property's role in the offense, (2) the role and culpability 
of the owner, and (3) the possibility of separating offending property that can 
readily be separated from the remainder." United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 
358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994). The second element is further explained as a deter-
mination of the owner's role, i.e., was it incidental or integral to the success 
of the criminal activity? See id. at 364. 
260. 843 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Ohio 1993), aiI'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 
52 F.3d 1416 (6th Cir. 1995). 
261. 851 F. Supp. 633 (M.D. Pa. 1994). 
262. See 429 S. Main St., 843 F. Supp. at 340. 
263. See id. at 340-41. 
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claimant was "suggestive of on-going criminal activity."264 Second, 
further indicia of the nature of the crime was found by comparing 
the maximum penalties under the federal drug statute (a sentence of 
ten years and a $500,000 finefis with the owner's aggregate sentence 
and penalties (the assessed criminal penalties of one year and a $6000 
fine plus the value of the property).266 Because the penalties were 
well within the sentencing guidelines, the forfeiture was held not to 
be disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense, and hence, not 
excessive.267 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial judge's decision stating that the owner 
did not raise issues of material fact as to whether the property was 
not used in the sale of drugs nor that the fine was excessive.268 
Thus, the 429 South Main Street court provided an objective 
standard with which to evaluate civil in rem forfeiture. The first step 
of the process is to determine whether the criminal activity is a one-
time occurrence, or an on-going activity. The final step is to compare 
the aggregate penalty with the maximum penalty provided by statute. 
If the total falls within the legislative mandate then the forfeiture is 
not excessive. 
Additional guidance is provided by Shelly's Riverside Heights 
Lot )(269 where the Government sought forfeiture of a log cabin and 
the ten-acre parcel that surrounded it.270 The owners were convicted 
of various drug offenses arising out of the cultivation, on the 
property, of marijuana for their personal consumption. 271 The trial 
judge found the forfeiture to be excessive for the following reasons: 
(1) the harmful reach of the crime was minimal because the illegal 
conduct did not go beyond the property; (2) the loss was significant 
to the owners because it was their sole asset; and (3) the government 
had failed to prove that the owners accrued any benefits from the 
drug activity outside the ready supply of marijuana they enjoyed.272 
264. [d. at 342. 
265. See id. 
266. See id. 
267. See id. 
268. See United States v. 429 S. Main St., 52 F.3d 1416, 1422 (6th Cir. 1995). 
269. 851 F. Supp. 633 (M.D. Pa. 1994). 
270. See id. at 635. 
271. See id. at 634. 
272. See id. at 638. The trial judge relied on a test set forth in United States v. 
Sorbello, 985 F.2d 716, 724 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding the factors to be weighed 
in determining excessiveness include "the seriousness of the offense, including 
the moral gravity of the crime measured in terms of the magnitude and nature 
of its harmful reach, against the severity of the criminal sanction!,] ... the 
personal benefit reaped by the defendant, the defendant's motive and culpa-
bility, and, of course, the extent that the defendant's interest in the enterprise 
itself are tainted by criminal conduct"). 
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Thus, in determining excessiveness, the court looked at the objective 
harm caused by the criminal activity, the significance of the asset to 
the property owners, and the benefits accrued by the criminal activity. 
While both 429 South Main Street and Shelly's Riverside Heights 
Lot X provide identifiable criteria to apply to civil in rem forfeiture, 
an additional element, put forth in Chandler and true to the historical 
meaning of in rem forfeiture, should also be applied. The first 
element of the Chandler test, which measures the "involvement of 
the property in the offense,''273 must also be a factor in determining 
excessiveness. The addition of this factor allows trial judges to 
consider the importance of the property to the underlying offense. 
Further, it permits forfeiture of property, regardless of its value, that 
is central to the criminal activity. 
Formulating a test relying on the amalgamation of these factors, 
yields a workable result. When the aggregate penalties, including the 
value of the forfeiture and the criminal sentence and fines imposed, 
are within the statutory maximum provided by the legislature, a 
rebuttable presumption of forfeitability is established. This presump-
tion can be overcome by the property owner showing that the harmful 
reach of the criminal activity was minimal, that no benefits were 
accrued by the activity, and that the property is the family home 
and the owner's sole asset. 
Conversely, forfeiture that exceeds the statutory maximum cre-
ates a rebuttable presumption of excessiveness. The government can 
overcome this presumption by showing that the property was so 
central to the criminal activity that it was, in actuality, an instru-
mentality of the offense. The factors enunciated in Chandler provide 
an excellent guide to this analysis. That is: 
(1) whether the use of the property in the offense was 
deliberate and planned or merely incidental and fortuitous; 
(2) whether the property was important to the success of 
the illegal activity; (3) the time during which the property 
was illegally used and the spatial extent of its use; (4) 
whether its illegal use was an isolated event or had been 
repeated; and (5) whether the purpose of acquiring, main-
taining or using the property was to carry out the offense. 274 
The proposed test, therefore, takes the best each of the three 
decisions have to offer. It provides criteria that are measurable. Most 
importantly, it is a tool that trial courts can use to determine 
excessiveness in a uniform and objective manner. 
273. United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 1994). 
274. Id at 365. . 
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B. The Double Jeopardy Clause 
By their very nature, civil in rem forfeiture actions are instituted 
following the use of property in a criminal activity.275 As explained 
above, the Supreme Court in Austin determined that such actions 
constituted governmentally imposed punishment subject to constitu-
tionallimitations and protections. 276 Accordingly, the forfeiture could 
be viewed as a second punishment for the underlying criminal of-
fense. 'Il7 In light of this dilemma, it becomes necessary to determine 
if civil in rem forfeiture, in conjunction with a criminal prosecution, 
offends the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
1. The Background of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
The application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to the civil arena 
was addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in United 
States v. Halper.278 The Halper Court held that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects citizens against three types 
of governmental abuse: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense 
after acquittal; 279 (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction;280 and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.281 
The third type of abuse, mUltiple punishment, is called into question 
when civil in rem forfeiture statutes are applied.282 
275. See supra notes 30-42, 47-51 and accompanying text. 
276. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text. 
277. See United States v. One Parcel Real Property, 908 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (D.R.I. 
1995); State v. Leyva, 909 P.2d 506, 510 (Az. Ct. App. 1995). 
278. 490 U.S. 435 (1989). The prohibition against double jeopardy is established, 
in Maryland, as a basic principle of common law and under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See Parojinog v. 
State, 282 Md. 256, 260, 384 A.2d 86, 88 (1978). "Federal double jeopardy 
principles are controlling in determining whether a defendant has been placed 
twice in jeopardy in violation of the federal Constitution." Johnson v. State, 
95 Md. App. 561, 566, 622 A.2d 199, 202 (1993) (citing Newton v. State, 280 
Md. 260, 373 A.2d 262 (1977». While the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
recently addressed the interplay between civil forfeiture (albeit not in rem), 
crhninal prosecution, and the Double Jeopardy Clause, it reached its conclusion 
by determining what constitutes punishment under the clause, and not with 
reference to the Halper criteria. See State v. Jones, 340 Md. 235, 666 A.2d 
128 (1995); see also infra notes 309-17 and accompanying text. The forfeiture 
action addressed by the Maryland court was in personam versus in rem. See 
supra notes 21-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction 
between in rem and in personam proceedings. 
279. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 668-69 (1896). 
280. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970). 
281. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 440; see also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 
717 (1969); Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 323, 558 A.2d 715, 
719 (1989); Johnson, 95 Md. App. at 565, 622 A.2d at 202. 
282. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); United States v. Perez, 70 F.3d 
345, 349 (1995). 
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The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether in rem 
forfeiture violates the Double Jeopardy Clause in United States v. 
Ursery.283 The Court held that "civil forfeiture does not constitute 
punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause."284 
Specifically, the Court applied a two prong test to determine if the 
forfeiture at issue violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.28s First, the 
applicable forfeiture statuteg286 were examined to determine if Con-
gress intended them to be civil or criminal proceedings. 287 Second, 
the Court considered whether the proceedings themselves were so 
punitive "in fact as to 'persuade us that the forfeiture proceeding[s] 
may not be viewed as civil in nature,' despite Congress's intent. "288 
The Court noted that the procedural mechanisms of the statutes 
at issue indicated Congress's intent that the statutes be civil in 
nature. 289 Turning to the second factor, the Court found "little 
evidence" that the forfeiture proceedings were so punitive as to 
contravene Congress's intent.290 Thus, the Court held that the nature 
of civil in rem proceedings creates a presumption that such forfeitures 
are not subject to double jeopardy protection. 291 
This presumption is, however, rebuttable "where the 'clearest 
proof' indicates that an in rem civil forfeiture is 'so punitive either 
in purpose or effect' as to be equivalent to a criminal proceeding. "292 
It is instructive, therefore, to examine the applicability of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause to instances where this presumption may be over-
283. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). 
284. Id at 2147. 
285. See id. 
286. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1994). 
287. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147. 
288. Id. (quoting United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 
366 (1984». 
289. See id. The Court recognized that they are in rem proceedings that are brought 
directly against property and, hence, are impersonal. See id. Specifically, the 
statutory scheme promulgated by Congress does not require actual notice if 
the government cannot identify a party with interest in the targeted property. 
See id. (discussing 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (1984». The burden of proof in such 
proceedings also indicated to the Court that Congress intended this to be a 
civil proceeding. See id. at 2148; see also supra note 53. 
290. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2148. Specifically, the Court found that the goals of 
the drug forfeiture statutes were nonpunitive. See id. The Court also examined 
other traditional indications of punishment. See id. at 2149. First, the Court 
determined that civil in rem forfeiture has not historically been regarded as 
punishment, under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. Second, the scienter 
requirement for crimes is not evident in the forfeiture statutes. See id. Finally, 
the Court found that while the statutes serve a deterrent purpose this, in and 
of itself, does not render them punishment. See id. 
291. See id. at 2148 n.3, 2149. 
292. Id. at 2148 n.3 (quoting United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 
U.S. 354, 365 (1984». 
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come.293 Whether a civil forfeiture action places an individual twice 
in jeopardy for the same offense depends on three factors: 294 (1) 
whether the forfeiture constitutes "punishment";29S (2) whether the 
forfeiture action and the criminal prosecution constitute "separate 
proceedings"; 296 and (3) whether the criminal conviction and the 
forfeiture proceeding are for the "same offense.''297 If all three of 
these factors are satisfied, the forfeiture will be in violation of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. 298 
2. The Elements of Double Jeopardy 
Q. Forfeiture as Punishment 
The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the government from 
seeking a second criminal punishment in a separate proceeding for 
the same conduct. 299 Civil sanctions, while a detriment to the indi-
293. It is also well held that a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose 
greater restrictions on law enforcement than those the Supreme Court of the 
United States holds to be required under federal constitutional standards. See 
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975). This tenet is especially relevant in 
the case at bar because the Court of Appeals of Maryland rested its decision 
on state constitutional grounds, i.e. article 25, and not on provisions of the 
federal constitution. See id. at 719-20. 
294. The Maryland courts have interpreted the Halper Court's application of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause to civil proceedings very narrowly. See, e.g., Johnson 
v. State, 95 Md. App. 561, 568, 622 A.2d 199, 203 (1993). In Maryland, the 
"separate proceeding" and "forfeiture as punishment" inquiries have been 
conflated and resolved by determining if a proceeding is civil or criminal in 
nature. See, e.g., id.; Allen v. State, 91 Md. App. 775, 785, 605 A.2d 994, 
999 (1992). The determination of whether the "same offense" prohibition is 
violated follows the Blockburger test, which in Maryland is referred to as the 
"required evidence test." See State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 391, 631 A.2d 
453, 456 (1993). 
295. See United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 
1994) amended by 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. United States 
v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996) (reversing the Ninth Circuit's determination 
that civil in rem forfeiture was per se punishment but not reaching the issues 
of "same offense" and "separate proceeding"); see also supra notes 283-92 
and accompanying text. 
296. See $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216. 
297. See United States v. Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. 1207, 1213 (D. Alaska 1995). 
298. See $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1210 (holding that civil in rem 
forfeiture is per se punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and that 
the proceedings are separate proceedings and thus violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause). But see Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. at 1214-15 (holding that civil forfeiture 
is not the same offense as criminal activity and, therefore, the Double Jeopardy 
Clause is not violated). 
299. See, e.g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stone v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235-36 
(1972); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938). 
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vidual, have traditionally not been subjected to double jeopardy 
analysis because such sanctions are remedial in nature and are used 
to ensure that the government is made whole.3°O Nevertheless, in 
Halper, the Court subjected civil forfeiture to the Double Jeopardy 
Clause for the first time. 301 In Halper, the Court restricted the 
application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to the "rare case . . . 
where a fixed penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge 
offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the dam-
ages he has caused. "302 Accordingly, the Court defined "rare case" 
as one in which "a defendant who has already been punished in a 
criminal prosecution [is] subjected to an additional civil sanction to 
the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized 
as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." 303 
Thus, the Halper Court carved out an exception to double 
jeopardy application in civil actions.304 Under Halper, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is implicated in the "rare case" that subjects a 
small time offender to a sanction grossly disproportionate to the 
harm caused. 30s The measurement of harm caused includes the costs 
incurred by society for the adjudication, investigation, and incarcer-
ation of the offender.306 Thus, civil sanctions, under Halper, are 
presumed not to be punitive, unless they are grossly disproportionate 
to the damage caused and, hence, qualify as the required "rare 
case. "307 Therefore, the effect of the sanction will determine whether 
or not the civil sanction is punitive and whether it invokes the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. 
By contrast, punishment under the Fifth Amendment in Mary-
land has historically been determined by establishing whether a statute 
is civil or criminal in nature.3OS Following Aravanis and Austin, this 
300. See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 
(1984); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States 
v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1943). 
301. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 441 (1989). 
302. Id. at 449. 
303. Id. at 448-49. 
304. See id. at 449-50. 
305. See id. 
306. See id. 
307. See supra note 290 and accompanying text. 
308. See Johnson v. State, 95 Md. App. 561, 568, 622 A.2d 199, 203 (1993). The 
character of the proceeding has, since Halper, been the bellwether test for 
determining whether civil penalties, assessed either subsequently, see Ewachiw 
v. Director of Fin., 70 Md. App. 58, 519 A.2d 1327 (1987), or prior to, see 
Allen v. State, 91 Md. App. 775, 789, 605 A.2d 994, 1001 (1992), criminal 
prosecution constitute double jeopardy. In classifying such actions the courts 
give great deference to the legislature and the intent and effect of the statutes 
that have been implicated. See Johnson, 95 Md. App. at 568, 622 A.2d at 
203. The primary inquiry is whether the statute was enacted to achieve a 
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analysis may change. While not directly addressing civil in rem 
forfeiture, the Court of Appeals of Maryland recently indicated that 
the Austin analysis may apply to the Fifth Amendment.309 
"legitimate governmental purpose" separate and apart from any incidental 
punitive effect. See Allen, 91 Md. App. at 785-86, 605 A.2d at 999-1000. Thus, 
if the legislative purpose was to punish an individual for specific acts, the 
statute was considered penal in nature; however, if it was enacted to curtail 
or discourage behavior deemed threatening to the future health and welfare of 
society as a whole, the statute was "Considered remedial and non-punitive. See 
id. 
Additionally, the procedural requirements of the statute are examined to 
determine if the statute is criminal or civil in nature. See id. at 786-87, 605 
A.2d at 1000. The factors analyzed include the standard of proof, whether the 
penalty could be imposed at the discretion of the trial judge, and the type of 
remedy provided by statute. See id. A preponderance of the evidence standard 
indicated that the proceeding was civil in nature. See id. Further, lack of 
discretion, on behalf of the trial judge, indicated a non-punitive purpose. See 
id "[S]tatute's mandate must be obeyed for it is not a penalty imposed as 
part of the criminal punishment that can be invoked at the discretion of the 
trial judge." State v. One 1967 Ford Mustang, 266 Md. 275, 278, 292 A.2d 
64, 66 (1972). 
Relying on Halper, the Maryland court categorized actions that impose 
restrictions on the trial judge's discretion, as to the imposition and form of 
the penalty, as strict liability crimes which "are principally directed at social 
betterment rather than punishment of the culpable individual." Allen, 91 Md. 
App. at 787, 605 A.2d at 1000 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 
447 n.8 (1989». Statutes, therefore, that satisfy the above requirements are 
considered civil and non-punitive and do not "run afoul" of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. See id. 
This framework was applied to Maryland's drug forfeiture statute, MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (1992), in Allen v. State, 91 Md. App. 775, 605 
A.2d 994 (1992). In Allen, the defendant was convicted of possession of a 
controlled dangerous substance. See id. at 778, 605 A.2d at 995. Prior to his 
conviction, the defendant's truck was forfeited pursuant to Maryland's drug 
forfeiture statute. See id. at 782, 605 A.2d at 997. Relying on Halper, the 
defendant argued that forfeiture of his truck constituted punishment and, 
therefore, his subsequent criminal conviction violated the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 782, 605 A.2d at 998. 
Following the parameters set forth in Halper, the court of special appeals 
evaluated the forfeiture statute at issue, art. 27, § 297, as to whether it was 
civil or criminal in nature. See id. at 785-88, 605 A.2d at 999-1000. In making 
its determination, the court relied on the legislative purpose behind the statute, 
see id. at 785-86, 605 A.2d at 999, and its statutory scheme, see id. at 787-88, 
605 A.2d at 1000. The court determined that the legislative purpose was "to 
curtail and discourage drug use and trafficking" and did not have, as its 
primary goal, punishment of drug offenders. [d. at 786, 605 A2d at 999-1000. 
Further, the statute's required burden of proof (a mere preponderance of the 
evidence versus beyond a reasonable doubt) indicated to the court that the 
statute was civil. See id. at 786, 605 A.2d at 1000. Additionally, the lack of 
judicial discretion afforded the trial judge, as to the penalty required by the 
statute, further indicated that the statute served a remedial as opposed to 
punitive goal. See id. In light of the above analysis the court held that "[s]ection 
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In State v. Jones,310 the court was faced with a double jeopardy 
challenge arising out of the suspension of a driver's license followed 
by a trial and conviction of drunk driving.3J1 Jones appealed to the 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, where he filed a motion to 
dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds. 312 The circuit court found 
that Jones had been subjected to double jeopardy and dismissed the 
drunk driving conviction.313 The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari on its own motion and, finding that the suspension 
of Jones's license was not punitive but remedial in nature, reversed 
the circuit court's decision. 314 
The court, in its determination that the statute under which 
Jones's license was suspended was not punitive, referred directly to 
Austin.31S Specifically, the court stated that the issue at bar was 
whether or not the statute in question could be "fairly" characterized 
as serving a non-punitive purpose. 316 The court set forth a three-part 
test to make this determination: (1) whether the statute at issue has 
historically been understood to constitute punishment; (2) whether, 
after examining the plain language and structure of the statute and 
to some degree its legislative history, the statute evinces a purpose 
different from the historic understanding given to analogous statutes; 
and (3) whether, if the statute serves both punitive and non-punitive 
purposes, the non-punitive purpose alone can justify the penalty 
imposed. 317 
These elements, coupled with the recent holding in Aravanis, 
indicate that the Double Jeopardy Clause may now apply in Maryland 
to civil in rem drug forfeiture on a per se basis. In Aravanis, the 
court determined that in rem forfeiture has historically been under-
stood to punish.318 Further, it noted that the "purpose of the Mary-
land forfeiture statute is, at least in part, punitive." 319 The first two 
2fJ7 is a civil statute" and "that a forfeiture proceeding is a civil action and 
when brought prior or subsequent to a criminal proceeding does not involve 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment nor the Maryland 
common law double jeopardy prohibition." Id. at 788, 605 A.2d at 1000. 
309. See State v. Jones, 340 Md. 235, 666 A.2d 128 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. 
Ct. 1265 (1996). 
310. Id. 
311. See id. at 240, 666 A.2d at 130. 
312. See id. at 241, 666 A.2d at 131. 
313. See id. 
314. See id. at 251, 666 A.2d at 136. 
315. See id. at 245-51, 666 A.2d at 132-36. 
316. See id. at 250, 666 A.2d at 135. 
317. See id. 
318. See Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 653, 664 A.2d 888, 892 (1995), 
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996). 
319. Id. at 655, 664 A.2d at 893. 
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elements of the Jones test have, therefore, been satisfied. The lone 
element of the Jones test yet to be determined in the civil in rem 
forfeiture arena is whether the non-punitive purpose of the drug 
forfeiture statutes can justify the penalties imposed. 
From the court's finding that section 297 serves in part to 
punish,l20 it can be inferred that the Maryland forfeiture statute 
serves remedial goals as well. Referencing a state senate floor report, 
the court noted that forfeiture is intended to be a "powerful prose-
cutorial tool for stopping CDS [controlled dangerous substance] 
offenders and depriving them of the huge profits reaped from their 
illegal activity." 321 While the court construed this as a punitive 
purpose, this statement can also be construed as remedial in nature. 
As the court's discussion in Aravanis equated the purpose of the 
Maryland statute to the purpose of the Federal Act,322 it is instructive 
to examine judicial interpretation of the Federal Act. 
The gravity of drug offenses and the harm they cause to society 
has been well acknowledged. In Department oj Revenue v. Kurth 
Ranch,323 Justice O'Connor, in dissent, noted that drug offenders 
should be at least partially responsible for the "money spent on drug 
abuse education, deterrence, and treatment. "324 Additionally, it has 
been recognized that the moral gravity of drug offenses represents 
"one of the greatest problems affecting the health arid welfare of 
our population." 325 Thus, 
Quite apart from the pernicious effects on the individual 
who consumes illegal drugs, such drugs relate to crime in 
at least three ways: (1) A drug user may commit crime 
because of drug-induced changes in physiological functions, 
cognitive ability, and mood; (2) A drug user may commit 
crime in order to obtain money to buy drugs; and (3) A 
violent crime may occur as part of the drug business or 
culture. 326 
It can be concluded, therefore, that congressional and legislative acts 
that curtail drug activity have a remedial purpose .. 
While Maryland's high court has stated that section 297 is part-
punishment because it strips assets from drug dealers and offenders, 
there is a remedial aspect to the statute. In depriving drug offenders 
320. See id. at 653, 664 A.2d at 892. 
321. Id at 655, 664 A.2d at 893 (S.B. 419, Floor Report, at 4 (Md. 1989». 
322. See id. at 655, 664 A.2d at 893. 
323. 511 U.S. 767 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
324. Id. at 794 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). 
325. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989). 
326. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment). 
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of "tainted" property, they are less able to regain entry into the 
drug market. This is illustrated by Aravanis's entry into the drug 
market. He acquired the funds to start his drug operation through 
the sale of a portion of his land.327 Absent those assets, he may have 
never amassed the funds necessary to participate in the distribution 
of marijuana. Additionally, the curtailment of drug activity may 
decrease related crimes and, thereby, reduce the extensive social costs 
of illegal drug activity. 
It may be argued, therefore, that the non-punitive purpose of 
the drug forfeiture statute justifies the penalties it imposes. If this 
reasoning is rejected, and it is determined that the drug forfeiture 
statute is indeed punishment, further double jeopardy analysis is 
required. That is, the remaining elements of a double jeopardy 
violation must be satisfied. It must be shown that the forfeiture 
action is a separate proceeding for the same offense. 328 
b. Separate Proceeding 
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the government 
from seeking both the full range of statutorily authorized civil and 
criminal penalties.329 It does, however, require that two actions that 
seek to punish for the same offense be brought in the same pro-
ceeding.330 This constraint is intended to prevent the government from 
seeking "a second punishment [because] it is dissatisfied with the 
punishment levied in the first action"33l or making "repeated attempts 
to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting 
him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to 
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity." 332 
Civil actions and criminal prosecutions are inherently distinct in 
nature.333 The federal circuit courts are, however, split as to whether 
327. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 646-47, 664 A.2d at 889. 
328. See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text. 
329. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989); accord Ohio v. Johnson, 
467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984) (noting that the Clause does not prohibit the 
prosecution of multiple offenses within a single prosecution). 
330. See United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 
1994), amended by, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. United States 
v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). 
331. United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. 
Bottone v. United States, 510 U.S. 1092 (1994). 
332. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
333. Civil and criminal proceedings are governed by different constitutional tenets, 
require different procedural rules, and are evaluated under different burdens 
of proof. See Peter J. Henning, Precedents in a Vacuum: The Supreme Court 
Continues to Tinker with Double Jeopardy, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 54, 67 
(Fall 1993). 
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civil in rem forfeiture and the related criminal conviction are but 
separate prongs of a single, coordinated proceeding.334 The Second 
Circuit, in United States v. Millan, promulgated a three-part test to 
determine if civil and criminal action constitute a single, coordinated 
proceeding: (1) whether both actions were filed nearly contempora-
neously; (2) whether the two actions involved the same criminal 
conduct; and (3) whether the two actions were part of a "coordinated 
effort to put an end to extensive" criminal activity. 33S This approach 
was soundly rejected by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
$405,089.23.336 Rather, in $405,089.23, the court, focusing on the 
procedural differences between criminal and civil actions,337 held that 
a "forfeiture case and a criminal prosecution would constitute the 
same proceeding only if they were brought in the same indictment 
and tried at the same time. "338 
The question as to whether civil in rem forfeiture and criminal 
prosecution for the underlying offense are considered separate pro-
ceedings has not been reached by the Maryland courts. Prior to 
Aravanis, this determination was based solely on the nature of the 
proceeding. If this analysis survives Aravanis, or if the approach 
promulgated by the Ninth Circuit339 is adopted, civil in rem drug 
forfeitures will be considered separate proceedings and may violate 
the Double Jeopardy Clause.340 Conversely, if the Maryland courts 
adopt the Millan analysis,341 double jeopardy implications will be 
avoided if: (1) the actions are filed nearly contemporaneously; (2) 
the two actions involve the same conduct; and (3) the two actions 
are part of a coordinated effort to end extensive criminal activity. 342 
The prohibition against separate proceedings is intended to pre-
vent the government from bringing a second action when it was 
dissatisfied with the result in the first action 343 and to protect an 
334. See, e.g., United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (1lth Cir. 
1994); Millan, 2 F.3d at 20; United States v. Smith, 874 F. Supp. 347, 350 
(N.D. Alaska 1995), aiI'd, 92 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 1996). But see $405,089.23 
U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216; United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 
(7th Cir), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994). 
335. See Millan, 2 F.3d at 20. 
336. 33 F.3d at 1216-22. 
337. The court noted that the two actions are tried at different times, before 
different fact finders and judges, and result in separate judgments. See id. at 
1216-17. 
338. [d. 
339. See supra notes 335-37 and accompanying text. 
340. See supra notes 335-37 and accompanying text. 
341. See supra notes 294-98 and accompanying text. 
342. See United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub 
nom. Bottone v. United States, 510 U.S. 1092 (1994). 
343. See id. 
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individual from the expense and anxiety associated with repeated 
prosecutions.344 Requiring adherence to the Millan factors34S minimizes 
these dangers. The contemporaneous filing requirement gives notice 
to the defendant that both actions will be litigated, and therefore, 
the anxiety of wondering if further prosecution will follow is elimi-
nated. Likewise, because the actions are filed at the same time, it 
cannot be claimed that the government instituted a second prosecution 
because it was dissatisfied with an earlier result, as neither case will 
have reached a final judgment. 
The Millan approach offers a pragmatic solution to the separate 
proceedings dilemma. It protects defendants and their property, while 
avoiding the dangers of prosecutorial harassment. The rejection of 
Millan, however, and a finding that the forfeiture action is indeed a 
separate proceeding does not necessarily implicate the Double Jeop-
ardy Oause. The "same offense" prong must also be satisfied for 
the Double Jeopardy Clause to be violated.346 
c. Same Offense 
In order for a defendant to prove a violation of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, the defendant must also show that he is being 
punished twice for the same offense. 347 The sole test for determining 
when two offenses are properly considered the same offense is known 
as the "same elements" or "Blockburger test. '>348 This test requires 
344. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). 
345. See Millan, 2 F.3d at 20. 
346. See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text. 
347. See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text. 
348. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see also, e.g., United 
States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993); Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 
Md. 315, 323, 558 A.2d 715, 719 (1989). The Blockburger test, or as it is 
labeled in Maryland the "required evidence test," is also applied in Maryland 
to determine if a second prosecution is barred by double jeopardy. See Snowden 
v. State, 321 Md. 612, 616-17, 583 A.2d 1056, 1058-59 (1991). The "required 
evidence test" was applied to civil in rem forfeiture in Allen v. State, 91 Md. 
App. 775, 788-89, 605 A.2d 994, 1000-01 (1992). The Allen court determined 
that civil forfeiture, pursuant to Section 297 of Article 27 of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland, was not a lesser included offense of possession of controlled 
dangerous substances. See id. at 789, 605 A.2d at 1001. The forfeiture statute 
holds the owner of the property strictly liable for the property's illegal use 
and, therefore, intent need not be proved by the state. See id. (discussing § 
297). Conversely, conviction of possession of a controlled dangerous substance 
(CDS) requires that the state prove intent. See id. (discussing §297). "Thus, 
neither civil forfeiture nor criminal CDS charges require the establishment of 
an essential element of the other." [d. Furthermore, the court recognized that 
in civil forfeiture the property is the defendant, as opposed to an individual 
defendant in criminal CDS cases. See id. The court held, therefore, that under 
196 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
a court to focus on the statutes involved, and determine what the 
prosecuting party is required to prove in order to successfully dem-
onstrate a prima Jacie case. 349 If each statute requires proof of an 
element the other does not, then the two offenses are deemed separate 
offenses under the Double Jeopardy Clause.3so The handful of district 
courts that have reached this issue have found civil in rem forfeiture 
and the related criminal offense each to contain an element the other 
does not 3S1 and, therefore, have determined that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause was not implicated.3S2 
the "required evidence test" civil forfeiture subsequent or prior to criminal 
proceedings does not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. 
The decision in Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 655, 664 A.2d 
888, 893 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996), that civil in rem drug 
forfeiture is punishment is a marked departure from the determination in Allen 
that section 297 is a civil statute. See Allen, 91 Md. App. at 738-88, 605 A.2d 
at 998-1000. The ramifications of this new characterization on double jeopardy 
application to the civil arena will depend upon the Maryland court's determi-
nation of: (1) whether the forfeiture action and the criminal prosecution 
constitute "separate proceedings"; (2) whether the criminal conviction and the 
forfeiture proceeding are for the "same offense"; and (3) whether the forfeiture 
constitutes "punishment." If it is determined that a forfeiture satisfies all three 
of the above factors, it violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
349. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696-97; United States v. White, I F.3d 13, 16 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1111 (1994). 
350. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696. 
351. See, e.g., United States v. Chick, 61 F.3d 682, 687 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that civil in rem forfeiture and criminal offenses each required proof of an 
element that the other did not); United States v. Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. 1207, 
1214-15 (D. Alaska 1995) (holding civil forfeiture and drug charges each contain 
element other does not, and thus Double Jeopardy Clause not violated); United 
States v. Thibault, 897 F. Supp. 495, 498 (D. Colo. 1995) (holding forfeiture 
was punishment for double jeopardy purposes and that actions for forfeiture 
and criminal conviction separate proceedings but that forfeiture and drug 
charges not same offense so Double Jeopardy Clause not violated); United 
States v. Amaya, 877 F. Supp. 528, 530 (D. Or. 1995) (holding forfeiture of 
firearms and criminal conviction of distribution of cocaine not same offense 
based on same elements test), a/I'd, 67 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1995); United States 
v. $7,137.02, 1995 WL 505481, ·5-6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 1995) (holding that 
civil forfeiture action seeking "illegal money" not barred by money laundering 
criminal conviction based on "same elements" test); United States v. Leaniz, 
1995 WL 143127, ·5 (S.D. Ohio March 31, 1995) (holding that elements of 
federal drug forfeiture statute are not the same as those of a conviction of 
possession with intent to distribute, and therefore, it is not the same offense 
even though based on the same conduct). 
352. An alternative analysis, based on a careful reading of Dixon, suggests that the 
substantive criminal offense constitutes a "lesser included offense" and, there-
fore, offends the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 
168-69 (1977) (holding double jeopardy prohibits government from prosecuting 
a defendant, once convicted, for a crime that contains all of the elements of 
the offense for which they were previously convicted). 
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An examination of the required elements of civil in rem forfeiture 
and the related substantive criminal offense reveal that each contain 
an element the other does not. 353 Specifically, the element required 
by in rem forfeiture, but not required by the related drug offenses, 
is proof that the property is "guilty. "354 In an in rem action, the 
government is not required to prove that the owner of the property 
had any involvement in the criminal drug offense that gives rise to 
civil in rem forfeiture. 355 In rem forfeiture provisions generally only 
require that the government prove an actus reus elemenP56 - that 
the property was used in connection with a drug offense. 3S7 "In 
contrast, none of the criminal statutes require the use of any specific 
property to prove guilt.''358 Likewise, the criminal offenses require 
proof of an element not contained in the civil forfeiture statute -
mens rea. 359 Unlike in rem forfeiture actions where the government 
need only prove an actus reus element, in the criminal prosecution 
the government must prove both an actus reus and mens rea. 360 Thus, 
in rem forfeiture and drug offenses each contain an element the 
other does not and, therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not 
violated. 
Applying this analysis to the instant case yields much the same 
result. Aravanis was convicted of "one count of possession of a 
controlled dangerous substance in sufficient amount to indicate an 
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense pursuant to article 27, 
section 286. "361 The statute expressly requires the proof of both mens 
rea (intent) and actus reus (manufacture, distribution, or dispens-
ing).362 Aravanis' s property was seized pursuant to article 27, section 
297(m) because it was used in connection with a violation of section 
286.363 The statute did not require that Aravanis use the property for 
illegal drug activities; it only required that the property be used for 
such activities. The statute, thus, did not require mens rea or intent 
353. See Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. at 1213. 
354. See United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 1994). 
355. See id. at 362; see also Joy Chatman, Note, Losing the Battle, but Not the 
War: The Future Use of Civil Forfeiture By Law Enforcement Agencies After 
Austin v. United States, 38 ST. LOUIS L. J. 739, 744 (1994). 
356. Actus reus is a wrongful deed. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 36 (6th ed. 1990). 
357. See United States v. Thibault, 897 F. Supp. 495, 498 (D. Colo. 1995). 
358. United States v. Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. 1207, 1214 (D. Alaska 1995). 
359. See id. Mens rea is "an element of criminal responsibility: a guilty mind; a 
'guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal intent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 
(6th ed. 1990). 
360. See Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. at 1213-14. 
361. Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 647, 664 ,A.2d 888, 889 (1995), 
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996). 
362. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286 (1996). 
363. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 649 n.7, 664 A.2d at 890 n.7. 
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be proven.364 Following this model of analysis the "required evidence 
test" is satisfied and the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated.36s 
V. CONCLUSION 
Civil in rem forfeiture historically focused on the "guilt" of an 
inanimate object. Finding this premise to be legal fiction, the Supreme 
Court, in Austin, recognized that such forfeitures focus on the 
culpability of the owner of the "thing" and afforded constitutional 
protection to them. The Court of Appeals of Maryland followed suit 
in Aravanis. This fundamental change in the scheme of in rem 
forfeiture characterizes such actions as governmentally imposed pun-
ishment. While the constitutional protections offer owners of seized, 
or threatened, property a check on sometimes overzealous law en-
forcement, the ramifications of this determination may preclude its 
use in the future. 
The court's determination that civil in rem forfeiture is a punitive 
statute will necessarily be utilized by felons and drug offenders to 
mount attacks on their convictions or asset forfeitures on double 
jeopardy grounds. It is unclear if the required elements for their 
success - separate proceedings that seek to punish for the same 
offense - will be satisfied. The Maryland court's decision in Jones 
has further clouded this issue. While the Constitution should not be 
364. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (1996). 
365. Alternatively, a second, broader approach, which has not been adopted by any 
court at this writing, would yield a contrary result. In Dixon, the Court found 
a subsequent prosecution for a drug offense was barred by a previous contempt 
sanction. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 700 (1993). The defendants 
were found in criminal contempt of court for "violating court orders that 
prohibited them from engaging in conduct that was later the subject of a 
criminal prosecution." [d. at 691. The Court held that the crime of violating 
the contempt order could not be abstracted from the substantive criminal drug 
offense, as the drug offense was, in effect, a lesser included offense. See id. 
at 698. Under this analysis, the Double Jeopardy Clause was violated. See id. 
at 700. Applying this analysis to Aravanis may lead to a bar against civil in 
rem forfeiture following a criminal conviction. Section 297 of the forfeiture 
statute specifically requires section 286 to have been violated. Following Dixon, 
the incorporated criminal code (section 286) becomes a '''species of lesser-
included offense[s).'" Dixon, 509 U.S. at 698 (quoting Illinois v. Vitale, 447 
U.S. 410, 420 (1980». This approach may be defeated, however, because Dixon 
was an in personam proceeding requiring the defendants, and no others, to 
violate the contempt order. In contrast, the forfeiture statutes do not require 
the government to prove that Aravanis was guilty of violating section 286. 
They need only show that activity violative of section 286 occurred on the 
property. 
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a casualty of the 'war on drugs,366 the analysis put forth in this 
discussion affords courts an avenue that maintains the integrity of 
the Constitution, and does not remove a well intentioned and needed 
law enforcement tool. 
Laurel Anne Albin 
366. United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. 
Bottone v. United States, 510 U.S. 1092 (1994); United States v. Lasanta, 978 
F.2d 1300, 1305, (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 
1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging 
"Drug Exception" to the Bill oj Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987»; United 
States v. Levine, 905 F. Supp. 1025, 1032 (M.D. Fla. 1995). 

